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HyAR-PPO: Hybrid Action Representation Learning for Incentive-Driven Task Offloading in Vehicular Edge Computing. [PDF]
Sensors (Basel)Wang W, Li M, Wu H.
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Model predictive game control for personalized and targeted interactive assistance. [PDF]
Commun EngHafs A +5 more
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Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems
4or, 2007zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Francisco Facchinei, Christian Kanzow
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Games and Economic Behavior, 1994
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History of Political Economy, 2004
Starting from John Nash's pioneering ideas, the paper examines from the viewpoint of the history of economic thought the origin and alternative interpretations of Nash equilibrium, the most widely used equilibrium notion in non-cooperative game theory.
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Starting from John Nash's pioneering ideas, the paper examines from the viewpoint of the history of economic thought the origin and alternative interpretations of Nash equilibrium, the most widely used equilibrium notion in non-cooperative game theory.
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Nash Equilibrium in Mastermind
2016Mastermind is a famous two-player deduction game. A Codemaker chooses a secret code and a Codebreaker tries to guess this secret code in as few guesses as possible, with feedback information after each guess. Many existing works have computed optimal worst-case and average-case strategies of the Codebreaker, assuming that the Codemaker chooses the ...
François Bonnet 0001, Simon Viennot
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2009
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Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1995Summary: Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an \(n\)-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe -- about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player ...
Aumann, Robert, Brandenburger, Adam
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Acta Mathematica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 1982
In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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In this paper we study Nash equilibria from a view point of topology and obtain new results for Nash-Pareto equilibria described in the first part of this paper [ibid. 40, 267-272 (1982; Zbl 0516.90087)].
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Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
Econometrica, 1992Summary: Suppose two agents play a game, each using a computable algorithm to decide what to do, these algorithms being common knowledge. We show that it is possible to act rationally provided we limit our attention to a natural subset of solvable games and to opponents who use rational algorithms; the outcome is a Nash equilibrium.
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