Results 81 to 90 of about 153 (144)

Los criterios de corrección en la teoría del razonamiento jurídico de Neil MacCormick

, 2014
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Una mirada crítica al argumento consecuencialista de Neil MacCormick

2022
Este trabajo se propone analizar el empleo del argumento consecuencialista en el razonamiento jurídico, especialmente, en la decisión judicial. Para tal fin, el documento se inicia con un breve recuento sobre las diferentes acepciones de este término.
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Neil MacCormick – A Personal Memoir

Scottish Affairs, 2009
Brilliantly articulate, witty persons of towering intellect and the highest academic achievement are by no means always admirable or likeable individuals. Should they also have considerable political acumen and knowledge, resulting in the holding of a wide range of academic and public offices, the chances of them being people with whom it is a delight ...
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Obituary: Professor Sir Neil MacCormick

Scottish Affairs, 2009
Neil MacCormick, who died on 5 April 2009 aged 67, was appointed Regius Professor of Public Law at Edinburgh University at the early age of 31 and held the post for a record, and highly distinguished, 36 years. During his tenure he developed theories on sovereignty and liberal nationalism which he advanced as an MEP and as author of the SNP's ...
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Neil MacCormick on Interpretation, Defeasibility, and the Rule of Law

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
The paper examines and critically reflects on Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning, and more specifically with his theory of interpretation. To begin with, I will try to summarize the main tenets of MacCormick’s theory of legal interpretation; I will then move on to consider a specific interpretive problem, that is the place of defeasibility in ...
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Neil MacCormick’s Theory of Law: A Non-Objectualist Interpretation

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004
This paper challenges a common opinion whereby Neil MacCormick’s legal theory is an internal revision of Herbert Hart’s approach. I shall not deny that MacCormick’s thought embodies some relevant legal-positivist features. My claim is rather that, important as these assumptions can be, they are not sufficient to classify his theory as positivist.
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