Dynamic Spillovers Between FinTech, Blockchain, and Green Finance: A Quantile Connectedness Approach
Business Strategy and the Environment, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper explores how financial innovation and environmental sustainability intersect by analyzing spillovers between FinTech, blockchain energy use, and green finance. Using a Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR) framework, we examine weekly data from 2018 to 2024 across 11 digital, environmental, and macro‐financial indices.
Mehmet Sahiner, Sisi Sung, James Devlin
wiley +1 more source
Smart pareto-optimized genetic algorithm for energy-efficient clustering and routing in wireless sensor networks. [PDF]
Sci RepRajalakshmi M, Ponni Alias Sathya S.
europepmc +1 more source
Evaluating Maturity Models in Healthcare Information Systems: A Comprehensive Review. [PDF]
Healthcare (Basel)Gomes J, Romão M.
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On eventual periodicity of networked evolutionary games [PDF]
2017 13th IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE), 2017 A networked evolutionary game (NEG) is called eventually periodic if each trajectory becomes periodic after a finite number time. It is easy to see that each finite-player NEG is eventually periodic. In this paper, we prove that it is undecidable whether an infinite-player NEG is eventually periodic, i.e., there exists no algorithm for verifying ...
Kuize Zhang, Lijun Zhang 0004
openaire +2 more sources
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Evolutionarily Stable Strategy of Networked Evolutionary Games
IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, 2014The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of networked evolutionary games (NEGs) is studied. Analyzing the ESS of infinite popular evolutionary games and comparing it with networked games, a new verifiable definition of ESS for NEGs is proposed. Then, the fundamental evolutionary equation (FEE) is investigated and used to construct the strategy profile ...
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Modeling, Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games
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