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Corporate power and global value chains: current approaches for conceptualizing the power of multinationals. [PDF]
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Journal of Economic Theory, 1991
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Demange, Gabrielle, Henriet, Dominique
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Demange, Gabrielle, Henriet, Dominique
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Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 2003
Multiobjective oligopoly models are constructed. The objectives of the first two models are to maximize profits and to maximize sales. In the third model the objectives are to maximize profits and to minimize risk. Giving more weight to risk minimization decreased the profits.
E, Ahmed, A S, Hegazi, A T Abd, El-Hafez
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Multiobjective oligopoly models are constructed. The objectives of the first two models are to maximize profits and to maximize sales. In the third model the objectives are to maximize profits and to minimize risk. Giving more weight to risk minimization decreased the profits.
E, Ahmed, A S, Hegazi, A T Abd, El-Hafez
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Comparative Statics for Oligopoly
International Economic Review, 1986This paper provides a unified treatment of comparative statics in conjectural variations models of (i) duopoly with a general form of product differentiation, and (ii) oligopoly with homogeneous products. It examines the correspondence between second-order conditions, stability conditions, and the signs of comparative static derivatives.
A. Dixit
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OLIGOPOLY GAMES AND THE COURNOT–BERTRAND MODEL: A SURVEY
Journal of economic surveys (Print), 2019Traditional oligopoly models hold that firms compete in the same strategic variable, output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). Alternatively, a hybrid model allows some firms to compete in output and other firms to compete in price, also known as the Cournot–
C. Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay
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Oligopoli simmetrici e oligoli asimmetrici
STUDI ECONOMICI, 2010In this work we are concerned with static price games played by a given number of capacity- constrained firms producing a homogeneous commodity. The focus is mainly on capacity configurations in which either all firms are equal or all are so except a larger one and such that no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
MASSIMO DE FRANCESCO, SALVADORI, NERI
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Information Technology Convergence and Services, 2018
We argue that the concentrated production and ownership of Bitcoin mining hardware arise naturally from the economic incentives of Bitcoin mining.
N. Arnosti, M. Weinberg
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We argue that the concentrated production and ownership of Bitcoin mining hardware arise naturally from the economic incentives of Bitcoin mining.
N. Arnosti, M. Weinberg
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A differential oligopoly game for optimal production planning and water savings
European Journal of Operational Research, 2017A production planning single-decision problem is extended to a production planning and water saving dual-decision problem. A differential oligopoly game in which product prices are sticky and water right trading occurs is used to study this problem ...
Baogui Xin, Minghe Sun
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Dynamic Oligopoly with Inventories
Econometrica, 1974This paper develops a dynamic model of oligopoly and discusses the existence and characteristics of optimal policies for firms in such a model. The firms are assumed to face a random demand so they hold inventories which fluctuate from one period to the next. This necessitates a dynamic model rather than a static one.
Kirman, Alan P, Sobel, Matthew J
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The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997
The private and social efficiency of two “behavioral” coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best‐reply dynamics (and fictitous play) which converge to the equilibrium, but with delay (interpreted as a ...
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The private and social efficiency of two “behavioral” coordination mechanisms is examined in this paper. In Cournot oligopoly, firms prefer immediate coordination on the Nash equilibrium (interpreted as a preplay communication) over the best‐reply dynamics (and fictitous play) which converge to the equilibrium, but with delay (interpreted as a ...
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