Results 51 to 60 of about 60,905 (206)

Why is competition in the European football market failing, and what should be done about it?

Economic Affairs, EarlyView.
Abstract The European football (soccer) market increasingly funnels rents to superstar players and intermediaries while weakening competitive balance. We trace this dynamic to two forces: (a) technological innovation that globalised broadcasting and magnified superstar returns, and (b) legal rulings boosting player mobility and causing bidding wars ...
Magnus Henrekson, Lars Persson
wiley   +1 more source

Pairwise Imitation and Tournament Graphs

International Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper investigates strategic dynamics under the behavioral rule of pairwise interact and imitate (PII), which requires minimal information and emphasizes outperforming opponents in pairwise interactions. We characterize PII using weak tournament graphs and, for a broad class of dynamics, establish a one‐shot stability result for ...
Sung‐Ha Hwang, Philip R. Neary, Jonathan Newton, Ryoji Sawa   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

How and Why EU Institutions Promote the Digital Euro: The Politics of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, EarlyView.
Abstract The future of money is a crucial issue in the digital age, and the emergence of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is widely recognised as a transformative development. However, despite its significant implications for monetary sovereignty, regulatory governance and strategic autonomy, we know relatively little about the political ...
Sebastian Heidebrecht
wiley   +1 more source

Oligopoly structure in the cryptocurrency market [PDF]

Anali Ekonomskog fakulteta u Subotici
Blockchain technology has been announced as the driving force behind the democratization of digital business. Various interest groups believed that cryptocurrencies would enable fast, cheap and anonymous payments over the Internet.
Tomić Nenad
doaj   +1 more source

Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions [PDF]

The Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shubik's demand functions is modelled as a cooperative TU game. For that purpose two optimization problems are solved to arrive at the description of the worth of any coalition in the so-called Bertrand Oligopoly ...
Aymeric Lardon, Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen   +2 more
core  

Market Shares as a Collusive Marker: Evidence From the European Truck Industry

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Collusion theory robustly predicts non‐cartel rivals will raise their prices and increase their output. As a typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share in the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by
Andreas Bovin, Iwan Bos
wiley   +1 more source

Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly [PDF]

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always socially insufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power.
Arijit Mukherjee
core  

Cross Ownership Versus Merger Under Product Differentiation

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We compare the merger participants' profits under a merger and under cross ownership (CO) in an oligopolistic industry with horizontally differentiated products. We show under Cournot competition that the merger participants would be better off under a symmetric CO than a merger.
Arijit Mukherjee
wiley   +1 more source

Product Positioning and Incentives to Innovate

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper shows that product positioning affects the incentives to invest in process innovation. The result is found using a model of price competition with three firms under horizontal product differentiation—and then extended to a more general Bertrand triopoly.
Emanuele Bacchiega, Paolo G. Garella
wiley   +1 more source

We Value Your Privacy: Behavior‐Based Pricing Under Endogenous Privacy

Journal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study a duopoly model of behavior‐based pricing in which consumers can either disclose or hide their data. We contrast two data policies. Under an open data policy, disclosed data is shared with all firms. In the unique equilibrium, all consumers disclose, and firms price discriminate, leading to welfare losses from inefficient poaching ...
Friederike Heiny, Tianchi Li, Michel Tolksdorf   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source