Results 51 to 60 of about 60,951 (215)

Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited

Bulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley   +1 more source

Cross‐Ownership and Welfare‐Inferior Price Competition with Relative Profit Delegation Contracts

Bulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We consider management reward contracts based on relative profit performance under cross‐ownership and find nonequivalence of price and quantity competition. We also examine an endogenous choice of competition mode under unilateral cross‐ownership and show that the welfare‐inferior price competition can appear unless the product's ...
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Pairwise Imitation and Tournament Graphs

International Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper investigates strategic dynamics under the behavioral rule of pairwise interact and imitate (PII), which requires minimal information and emphasizes outperforming opponents in pairwise interactions. We characterize PII using weak tournament graphs and, for a broad class of dynamics, establish a one‐shot stability result for ...
Sung‐Ha Hwang, Philip R. Neary, Jonathan Newton, Ryoji Sawa   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions [PDF]

The Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shubik's demand functions is modelled as a cooperative TU game. For that purpose two optimization problems are solved to arrive at the description of the worth of any coalition in the so-called Bertrand Oligopoly ...
Aymeric Lardon, Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen   +2 more
core  

Estrutura de capital e estratégias competitivas

Cadernos EBAPE.BR
Este artigo apresenta um survey dos estudos que destacam os efeitos das decisões de financiamento na capacidade de concorrência das firmas. São descritos os resultados de modelos teóricos e pesquisas empíricas publicados nas últimas duas décadas ...
Rogério Sobreira, Felipe Rente, Claudio Figueiredo   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Strategic delegation and risk‐taking in R&D: Partial delegation versus full delegation

International Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.
Abstract We examine firm's risk‐taking decisions in R&D under two different delegation strategies between partial delegation (PD) and full delegation (FD): FD authorizes both quantity and R&D risk but PD only authorizes quantity. Cournot firms under the FD set higher profit weights at the expected value of cost realization, which can lessen competition,
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Franco Modigliani and oligopoly

PSL Quarterly Review, 2005
Modigliani became interested in Keynes's General Theory even before knowing anything about economics. After becoming a professional economist, through his research both theoretical and applied, his teaching, his policy recommendations to fight mass ...
Paolo Sylos Labini
doaj  

Strategic environmental corporate social responsibility in a vertically differentiated duopoly

International Journal of Economic Theory, EarlyView.
Abstract We investigate firms' strategic incentives to adopt environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) in the presence of quality–cost differences within a vertically differentiated duopoly. We find that (i) the low‐quality firm chooses a higher (lower) ECSR level than the high‐quality firm when the low‐quality firm has a relatively more ...
Mingqing Xing, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly [PDF]

In a bilateral oligopoly, Ghosh and Morita (‘Social desirability of free entry: a bilateral oligopoly analysis, 2007, IJIO) show that entry is always socially insufficient if the upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power.
Arijit Mukherjee
core  

The Sweezy model of price competition among private labels of chain stores

Agricultural Economics (AGRICECON), 2017
The aim of the paper is to verify and explain the actual effects of the Sweezy oligopoly model and its eventual impact on the consumer demand and the structure of the food supply of chain stores.
Roman Svoboda, Lenka Kopecka
doaj   +1 more source