Results 91 to 100 of about 601,863 (315)

Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Collaboration in Prefabricated Building Supply Chain Based on Differential Game

open access: yesBuildings
Supply chain collaboration is an important guarantee for improving the performance of prefabricated construction projects and exerting its advantages. The aim of this study was to explore the level and effect of supply chain collaboration under a no-cost-
Junwu Wang, Denghui Liu, Shi Qiao
doaj   +1 more source

Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper describes a principal-agent relationship with a supervisor who has information about the agent. The agent and the supervisor have the possibility to collude and misinform the principal.
Strausz, R.
core   +1 more source

Tailored Hierarchical Porous Copper Architectures via Three Dimensional Printing and Pressure‐less Sintering for Next‐Generation Lithium‐Metal Batteries

open access: yesAdvanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.
A hierarchical porous copper current collector is fabricated via three‐dimensional printing combined with pressureless sintering to stabilize lithium metal anodes. The interconnected architecture lowers local current density, guides uniform Li deposition within pores, and suppresses dendrite growth.
Alok Kumar Mishra, Mukul Shukla
wiley   +1 more source

The Application of The Agency Theory In Planning And Staff Assignment of CPA Firms [PDF]

open access: yesبررسی‌های حسابداری و حسابرسی, 1994
This article extends the concept of agency theory to multi-objective contractual settings and operationalizes the elements of the basic agency model by applying that model to the operations of a CPA firm, and specifying the pareto-optimal contracts that ...
Dr. Mohammad Narnazi
doaj  

Optimal agency contract for incentive and control under moral hazard in dynamic electric power networks

open access: yesIET Smart Grid, 2019
The authors propose an optimal contract mechanism under moral hazard in discrete-time dynamic electric power networks. As the utility (system operator) cannot adjust the control input of the agents (end-users) directly in real time out of respect for ...
Yasuaki Wasa   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

"Strategic Default Jump as Impulse Control in Continuous Time" [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper presents a new approach for modeling an optimal debt contract in continuous time. It examines a competing contract design in a continuous-time environment with Markov income shocks and costly veri able information.
Hisashi Nakamura
core  

Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
While expensive cryptographically verifiable computation aims at defeating malicious agents, many civil purposes of outsourced computation tolerate a weaker notion of security, i.e., “lazy-but-honest” contractors. Targeting this type of agents, we develop optimal contracts for outsourcing of computational tasks via appropriate use of rewards ...
Viet Pham, M. H. R. Khouzani, Carlos Cid
openaire   +2 more sources

Near‐Field Electrospinning Micro‐Printhead Achieves Precise Control of Nanofiber Deposition

open access: yesAdvanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.
A micro‐printhead for near‐field electrospinning enables reproducible deposition of polymer nanofibers with diameters below 50 nm. Systematic parameter studies uncover the mechanisms linking operating conditions to fiber morphology, paving the way for precise and low‐cost nanoscale 3D manufacturing.As a high‐resolution, cost‐effective, and rapid ...
Han Xu, Dario Mager, Jan G. Korvink
wiley   +1 more source

Games Suppliers and Producers Play : Upstream and Downstream Moral Hazard with Unverifiable Input Quality [PDF]

open access: yes
We pin down the optimal relational contract between an input supplier and a final goods producer given a framework of bilateral moral hazard with variable but non-verifiable input quality.
Brishti Guha
core   +4 more sources

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy