Results 1 to 10 of about 356,836 (162)
Optimal Incentives Schemes under Homo Moralis Preferences
This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal.
Roberto Sarkisian
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Invasion of Optimal Social Contracts
The stag-hunt game is a prototype for social contracts. Adopting a new and better social contract is usually challenging because the current one is already well established and stable due to sanctions imposed on non-conforming members.
Alessandra F. Lütz +3 more
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Multiperiod ordering model with put option contracts under inflation [PDF]
This paper considers the rising price and the shrinking demand caused by the inflation. To manage these above risks, the firm has a chance to place two types of orders in each period, viz., the firm order and the put options order.
Wan Nana, Li Li
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Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors [PDF]
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor.
Giebe, Thomas, Gürtler, Oliver
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Learning in a Hiring Logic and Optimal Contracts
This paper examines a hiring logic problem in which all players involved in this game are exposed to scenarios where they can learn from the changes and these modifications influence their preferences; consequently, their decision-making differs from the
Jose Iranildo Sales +1 more
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Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors [PDF]
This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce
Strausz, Roland
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Team Incentives under Moral and Altruistic Preferences: Which Team to Choose?
This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism.
Roberto Sarkisian
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Optimal Contracts for Agents with Adverse Selection
Due to information asymmetry, adverse selection exists largely in the multiagent market. Aiming at these problems, we develop two models: pure adverse selection model and mixed adverse selection and moral hazard model.
Chao Li, Zhijian Qiu
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Fairness and Contract Design [PDF]
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful
Fehr, Ernst +2 more
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A variational inequality arising from optimal surrender of variable annuity with lookback benefit
We introduce a variable annuity (VA) contract with a surrender option and lookback benefit, that is, the benefit of the VA contract is linked to the maximum process of the policyholder’s account value. In contrast to the constant guarantee model provided
Junkee Jeon, Minsuk Kwak
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