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Ownership concentration in Russian industry [PDF]

, 2004
Using a unique dataset built for the World Bank’s Country Economic Memorandum, we find that a relatively small number of tycoons ('oligarchs') control a substantial share of Russia’s economy. Oligarchs seem to run their empires more efficiently than other Russian owners.
Sergei Guriev, Andrei Rachinsky
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Confronting Horizontal Ownership Concentration

The Antitrust Bulletin, 2021
Developments in capital markets have fueled a concentration of horizontal ownership across competing firms, and this has been linked to anticompetitive effects and economic underperformance. The debate about such ownership concentration has proven contentious and controversial. This symposium titled “Common Ownership: Illuminating a Great 21st Century
Einer Elhauge, Sumit K. Majumdar, Martin C. Schmalz   +2 more
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Concentrated Ownership and Labor Relations

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2006
Political struggles between the emerging European liberal states and the Catholic church in the 18th and 19th centuries provoked the formation of highly oppositional labour movements, resulting in Catholic countries having conflictual labour relations until the present.
Mueller, Holger M, Philippon, Thomas
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Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison

Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008
This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country.
Gugler, Klaus, Mueller, Dennis C., Yurtoglu, B. Burcin   +2 more
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Ownership, Concentration, and Investment

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2018
The US business sector has underinvested relative to profits, funding costs, and Tobin's Q since the early 2000s. Building on prior work, we argue that decreasing competition, rising intangibles, and tightening governance explain, respectively, about one-half, one-third, and one-sixth of the investment gap.
Germán Gutiérrez, Thomas Philippon
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Ownership level, ownership concentration and liquidity

Journal of Financial Markets, 2007
Abstract We examine the link between the liquidity of a firm's stock and its ownership structure, specifically, how much of the firm's stock is owned by insiders and institutions, and how concentrated is their ownership. We find that the liquidity-ownership relation is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than insider ownership ...
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Shareholder protection, ownership concentration and FDI

Journal of Economics and Business, 2011
Abstract Host country's weaker legal shareholder protection may make it costlier for parent shareholders to monitor the foreign subsidiary and hold managers accountable in case of misconduct. This prospect may motivate the managers to invest in such foreign environments. However, the agency costs associated with such investments can increase as well.
Vahe Lskavyan, Mariana Spatareanu
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Concentrated Corporate Ownership

2000
Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large US firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller US firms and in all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms is surprising.
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Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation

German Economic Review, 2004
AbstractConcentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder,
Jeremy S. S. Edwards, Alfons J. Weichenrieder   +1 more
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