Results 131 to 140 of about 2,394 (173)
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South African Journal of Philosophy, 2007
No Abstract.South African Journal of Philosophy Vol.26 (2) 2007:239 ...
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No Abstract.South African Journal of Philosophy Vol.26 (2) 2007:239 ...
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Resource-Bounded Paraconsistent Inference
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2003zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Marquis, Pierre, Porquet, Nadège
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2002
A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything).
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A logic is paraconsistent if it does not validate the principle that from a pair of contradictory sentences, A and ∼A, everything follows, as most orthodox logics do. If a theory has a paraconsistent underlying logic, it may be inconsistent without being trivial (that is, entailing everything).
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Studia Logica, 1984
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Carnielli, Walter Alexandre +1 more
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Carnielli, Walter Alexandre +1 more
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Aspects of Paraconsistent Logic
Logic Journal of IGPL, 1995This paper discusses an extension \(C^+_1\) of da Costa's system \(C_1\) of paraconsistent logic. A Hilbert-style version and a sequent calculus version of the system are presented as well as a bivalent non-truth-functional semantics. It is shown that \(C^+_1\) is semantically decidable, but that the replacement theorem does not hold.
da Costa, Newton C. A. +2 more
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Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1995
\textit{G. Priest} [``The logic of paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] presents a paraconsistent logic, that is, one which does not collapse into all statements being provable but in which nevertheless ``\(A\vee \neg A\)'' is logically true and ``\(A \wedge\neg A\)'' is logically false. But, argues Slater in the present paper,
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\textit{G. Priest} [``The logic of paradox'', J. Philos. Logic 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] presents a paraconsistent logic, that is, one which does not collapse into all statements being provable but in which nevertheless ``\(A\vee \neg A\)'' is logically true and ``\(A \wedge\neg A\)'' is logically false. But, argues Slater in the present paper,
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Paraconsistent Computation Tree Logic
New Generation Computing, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Kaneiwa, Ken, Kamide, Norihiro
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Paraconsistent Logics and Translations
Synthese, 2000zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
D'Ottaviano, Itala M. Loffredo +1 more
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Negation and Paraconsistent Logics
Logica Universalis, 2011zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Dutta, Soma, Chakraborty, Mihir K.
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A Paraconsistent Conditional Logic
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ma, Minghui, Wong, Chun-Ting
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