Results 41 to 50 of about 5,275 (212)
Jaina logic: a model-based analysis of the seven predications
Círculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación, 2023 A relevant part of Jainism is its logic. Jaina logic gives tools to communicate and argue. However, it is problematic from the western perspective: it seems to be a paraconsistent system, that is, a system in which a fact and the denial of that very ...
Miguel López Astorga
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Conceptual engineering: Conceptual innovation via conceptual refinement
Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 344-355, July 2025.Abstract Mona Simion and Christoph Kelp (2020) have recently challenged the traditional conceptual engineering project. They defend a reorientation of this project that moves away from correcting conceptual shortcomings and emphasizes conceptual innovation instead. Central to their proposal is the role played by etiological functions. The present paper
Otávio Bueno
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On Paracomplete Versions of Jaśkowski's Discussive Logic
Bulletin of the Section of LogicJaśkowski's discussive (discursive) logic D2 is historically one of the first paraconsistent logics, i.e., logics which 'tolerate' contradictions. Following Jaśkowski's idea to define his discussive logic by means of the modal logic S5 via special ...
Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska +2 more
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Modal logic S4 as a paraconsistent logic with a topological semantics [PDF]
, 2017 In this paper the propositional logic LTop is introduced, as an extension of classical propositional logic by adding a paraconsistent negation. This logic has a very natural interpretation in terms of topological models.
E. Coniglio, Marcelo +1 more
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Introduction to the special issue New Thoughts on Conceptual Engineering
Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 3-4, Page 283-293, July 2025.Abstract Conceptual engineering has emerged in recent times as a significant topic in current philosophical literature. The now vast list of references includes works on more general or conceptual issues, such as describing the nature of conceptual engineering, how we may respond to the different objections to it, how it is related to philosophical ...
Xavier de Donato‐Rodríguez
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Dialectical Multivalued Logic and Probabilistic Theory
Mathematics, 2017 There are two probabilistic algebras: one for classical probability and the other for quantum mechanics. Naturally, it is the relation to the object that decides, as in the case of logic, which algebra is to be used.
José Luis Usó Doménech +2 more
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Hunting for Paradoxes: A Research Strategy for Cognitive Science
Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 770-801, July 2025.Abstract How should we identify interesting topics in cognitive science? This paper suggests that one useful research strategy is to hunt for, and attempt to resolve, paradoxes: that is, apparent or real contradictions in our understanding of the mind and of thought.
Nick Chater
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Transreal arithmetic as a consistent basis for paraconsistent logics [PDF]
, 2014 Paraconsistent logics are non-classical logics which allow non-trivial and consistent reasoning about inconsistent axioms. They have been pro- posed as a formal basis for handling inconsistent data, as commonly arise in human enterprises, and as ...
Anderson, James A.D.W., Gomide, Walter
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Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 2, Page 709-733, March 2025.Abstract According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a ...
Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin
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Unveiling the nature of philosophical problems: Formal and conceptual aspects
Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 17-34, January 2025.Abstract This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non‐philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics.
Jens Harbecke
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