Results 271 to 280 of about 4,175,963 (385)
Deep Q-Managed: a new framework for multi-objective deep reinforcement learning. [PDF]
Menezes R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
Multi-objective machine learning framework for welfare-optimized health insurance design in infectious disease management (Gastroenteritis). [PDF]
Momahhed SS, Haghighathoseini A.
europepmc +1 more source
Abstract Many policymakers are unwilling, or think that it is infeasible, to perform comprehensive cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of programmes in social policy arenas. What principles actually underlie CBA? An understanding is necessary to assess whether other evaluation methods are close enough to CBA to provide useful information on social efficiency ...
Aidan R. Vining, Anthony E. Boardman
wiley +1 more source
Energy and daylighting trade-offs in residential window design: multi-objective optimization for hot-arid regions. [PDF]
Ramezani M +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Abstract Generalizability theory (G‐theory) defines a statistical framework for assessing measurement reliability by decomposing observed variance into meaningful components attributable to persons, facets, and error. Classic G‐theory assumes homoscedastic residual variances across measurement conditions, an assumption that is often violated in ...
Philippe Rast, Peter E. Clayson
wiley +1 more source
Retrospective evaluation of high-dose-rate brachytherapy multicriteria planning using physical dose versus radiobiological criteria for prostate cancer. [PDF]
Iorio-Duval C +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley +1 more source

