Results 271 to 280 of about 4,175,963 (385)

Deep Q-Managed: a new framework for multi-objective deep reinforcement learning. [PDF]

open access: yesFront Artif Intell
Menezes R   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war

open access: yesAmerican Journal of Political Science, EarlyView.
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley   +1 more source

Cost–benefit analysis and ‘next best’ methods to evaluate the efficiency of social policies: As in pitching horseshoes, closeness matters

open access: yesAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics, EarlyView.
Abstract Many policymakers are unwilling, or think that it is infeasible, to perform comprehensive cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of programmes in social policy arenas. What principles actually underlie CBA? An understanding is necessary to assess whether other evaluation methods are close enough to CBA to provide useful information on social efficiency ...
Aidan R. Vining, Anthony E. Boardman
wiley   +1 more source

Enhancing generalizability theory with mixed‐effects models for heteroscedasticity in psychological measurement: A theoretical introduction with an application from EEG data

open access: yesBritish Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, EarlyView.
Abstract Generalizability theory (G‐theory) defines a statistical framework for assessing measurement reliability by decomposing observed variance into meaningful components attributable to persons, facets, and error. Classic G‐theory assumes homoscedastic residual variances across measurement conditions, an assumption that is often violated in ...
Philippe Rast, Peter E. Clayson
wiley   +1 more source

Cooperation and Managerial Delegation in Duopoly Revisited

open access: yesBulletin of Economic Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper shows that the cooperative game with managerial delegation (in both the Cournot and Bertrand settings) and the Bertrand benchmark game (without delegation or cooperation) are equivalent in duopoly. The cooperative solution may be the equilibrium of the game, and this outcome can be beneficial for consumer surplus and welfare when ...
José A. Novo‐Peteiro
wiley   +1 more source

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