Results 171 to 180 of about 2,313 (260)

Insights from the Presidential Addresses to the Agricultural Economics Society

open access: yesJournal of Agricultural Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The Society's published presidential addresses have embraced a wide range of subject matter, reflecting a ‘road well travelled’ in agricultural economics. The areas covered include the development and use of data and statistics, lessons from history, sectoral analysis, land economics, international trade and international development.
David Blandford
wiley   +1 more source

Buyer‐Optimal Platform Design

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A platform matches a unit mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to a unit mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit‐quality. After matching, sellers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it price‐offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the platform, but sellers make inferences from
Daniele Condorelli, Balazs Szentes
wiley   +1 more source

The Political Economy of Patent Buyouts

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Incentivizing innovation through buyouts may alleviate the social costs associated with patent power, but the political economy and feasibility of this potentially important financing mechanism have been understudied. We study an international setting of countries with different innovation and financing capabilities, and where financing ...
Amal Ahmad   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley   +1 more source

Full Discretion is Inevitable

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This article studies a dynamic project‐selection game between a Principal and an Agent with conflicting interests. Only the Agent knows what projects are feasible. In each period before a project is selected, the Principal imposes a restriction set. The Agent can select any feasible project within this set, thereby ending the game.
Wenhao Li
wiley   +1 more source

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