Results 141 to 150 of about 1,714,987 (218)

Perceiving Particulars

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Causalists contend that you see a specific object (rather than a lookalike, or no object at all) because that object sits at the beginning of an appropriate causal chain that terminates in your visual experience. We argue that neither standard causalists nor their non‐causalist opponents can adequately accommodate a striking asymmetry between ...
Dominic Alford‐Duguid, Umrao Sethi
wiley   +1 more source

Mercy: A Right and a Privilege

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Many accounts of mercy nowadays are morally neutral; agents show mercy when they impose less harm than they might have, whether or not such harm would have been permissible. More morally infused perspectives are often dismissed; for they seem too narrow to capture the full gamut of ordinary usage.
Jessica Isserow
wiley   +1 more source

Redeeming Relative Value: Indexicality and Consequentializing Agent‐Centered Norms

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Robert Nozick doubted forms of consequentialism that employ so‐called “agent‐relative value” because he found them “gimmicky.” This doubt has been sharpened by Don Regan, Mark Schroeder, and others into the objection that agent‐relative value lacks the practical importance we associate with good simpliciter.
Nathan Robert Howard
wiley   +1 more source

Improving Lives and Avoiding Harm

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT The Asymmetry in population ethics holds that creating a miserable person is morally impermissible, while not creating a happy person is morally permissible, all else being equal. Harm‐avoidance theories explain the Asymmetry by claiming that, in certain contexts, only actions resulting in harm are impermissible.
Tim Campbell, Patrick Kaczmarek
wiley   +1 more source

Solving the Dual Puzzles of Collective Harm

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Suppose some uncoordinated group of agents causes tremendous harm, but none of the individuals could have meaningfully changed this result by acting differently. These “collective harm” cases have been the subject of extended philosophical discussion, but this paper argues that there are really two different, if connected, puzzles presented by
Taylor Koles
wiley   +1 more source

Bias Against Boltzmann Brains?

open access: yesNoûs, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT A popular indifference principle for self‐locating probability faces skeptical challenges, most notably a skeptical challenge concerning Boltzmann Brains. We examine the prospects for various views that prescribe some degree of bias in place of indifference.
Sinan Dogramaci   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

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