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In Defense of Perceptual Content
2018Chapter 5 takes a step back and traces the way in which excessive demands on the notion of perceptual content invite an austere relationalist account of perception. It argues that any account that acknowledges the role of discriminatory, selective capacities in perception must acknowledge that perceptual states have representational content.
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The European Legacy
AbstractThe book has three main topics or concerns. (1) The diversity of the senses. Though all perception represents, the similarity between sense modalities ends there. The senses’ respective representational modes, styles, and structures differ very strongly from each other. (2) The Layering thesis.
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AbstractThe book has three main topics or concerns. (1) The diversity of the senses. Though all perception represents, the similarity between sense modalities ends there. The senses’ respective representational modes, styles, and structures differ very strongly from each other. (2) The Layering thesis.
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Noûs, 2011
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids the objections of austere relationalists.
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Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids the objections of austere relationalists.
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Perceptual Input Is Not Conceptual Content
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2019Can we represent number approximately? A seductive reductionist notion is that participants in number tasks rely on continuous extent cues (e.g., area) and therefore that the representations underlying performance lack numerical content. I suggest that this notion embraces a misconception: that perceptual input determines conceptual content.
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Perceptual content is indexed to attention
Synthese, 2016Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content.
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1999
Abstract Everson examines Aristotle's use of the term empeiria, particularly as it appears in Metaphysics I.1 and Posterior Analytics II.19. Empeiria is usually translated as ‘experience’, but Everson argues that it ought to be interpreted as ‘an acquired perceptual concept’.
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Abstract Everson examines Aristotle's use of the term empeiria, particularly as it appears in Metaphysics I.1 and Posterior Analytics II.19. Empeiria is usually translated as ‘experience’, but Everson argues that it ought to be interpreted as ‘an acquired perceptual concept’.
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SKEPTICISM AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT
Philosophical Papers, 1997Critique de la conception internaliste et fondationnaliste de la justification du contenu subjectif des croyances developpee par P. Moser dans son ouvrage intitule «Knowledge and evidence» (1989). Examinant la relation entre l'explication, l'experience perceptive, la proposition et le caractere non-conceptuel du contenu subjectif, l'A.
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Mind, 2016
Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation.
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Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation.
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Dimensions of Perceptual Content
2020Abstract This chapter presents a causal theory of perception according to which perceiving something is, in outline, equivalent to its producing or sustaining, in the right way, a phenomenal representation of it. Commonly, the perceived object plays this causal role reliably enough to yield perceptual knowledge, provided we form ...
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Individualism and Perceptual Content
Mind, 1991Tyler Burge (1986) has argued that the practice of psychology-particularly the practice of the psychology of vision-is not individualistic. This is to say, roughly, that the semantic contents of states cited in psychological theory do not supervene upon the internal constitution-physical, chemical, neural, or functional-of the creature whose states ...
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