Results 131 to 140 of about 3,473 (181)
Understanding the experiences of family, friends and carers attending Recovery Colleges: focus group study. [PDF]
BJPsych OpenBowness B +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2016
Although, Feyerabend himself seems never to have used the term 'perspectivism' to designate a philosophical position, I think his views about science are very well characterized as perspectival. In fact, his later writings contain much that contributes to current thinking about perspectivism. I would like, therefore, to distinguish my own perspectivism
Ronald Giere
exaly +3 more sources
Although, Feyerabend himself seems never to have used the term 'perspectivism' to designate a philosophical position, I think his views about science are very well characterized as perspectival. In fact, his later writings contain much that contributes to current thinking about perspectivism. I would like, therefore, to distinguish my own perspectivism
Ronald Giere
exaly +3 more sources
Nietzsche’s Epistemic Perspectivism [PDF]
Synthese Library, 2019 Nietzsche offers a positive epistemology, and those who interpret him as a skeptic or a mere pragmatist are mistaken. Instead he supports what he calls per- spectivism.
Steven D Hales
exaly +5 more sources
From phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to realist perspectivism [PDF]
European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2022 This paper draws on the phenomenological-hermeneutical approaches to philosophy of science to develop realist perspectivism, an integration of experimental realism and perspectivism. Specifically, the paper employs the distinction between “manifestation”
exaly +4 more sources
Mereological Perspectivism in Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy CompassABSTRACT This paper presents the philosophical implications of the position that we call mereological perspectivism. Mereological perspectivism asserts that determining whether a composite biological object constitutes a single unit (an individual) necessarily depends on the selection of privileged parts of the composite.
Javier Suárez, Adrian Stencel
exaly +2 more sources
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 1994
Relevant le defi de leur incommensurabilite, l'A. compare les points de vue radicalement differents de Thomas d'Aquin et de Nietzsche en ce qui concerne le role de l'intellect et de la volonte dans l'activite humaine. Le desaccord entre les deux penseurs releve de leur differente methode philosophique: genealogique pour Nietzsche, dialectique pour ...
openaire +1 more source
Relevant le defi de leur incommensurabilite, l'A. compare les points de vue radicalement differents de Thomas d'Aquin et de Nietzsche en ce qui concerne le role de l'intellect et de la volonte dans l'activite humaine. Le desaccord entre les deux penseurs releve de leur differente methode philosophique: genealogique pour Nietzsche, dialectique pour ...
openaire +1 more source
Noûs, 2019
AbstractConsider the sentence “Lois knows that Superman flies, but she doesn't know that Clark flies”. In this paper we defend a Millian contextualist semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions, according to which ordinary uses of this sentence are true but involve a mid‐sentence shift in context. Absent any constraints on the relevant parameters
Jeremy Goodman, Harvey Lederman
openaire +1 more source
AbstractConsider the sentence “Lois knows that Superman flies, but she doesn't know that Clark flies”. In this paper we defend a Millian contextualist semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions, according to which ordinary uses of this sentence are true but involve a mid‐sentence shift in context. Absent any constraints on the relevant parameters
Jeremy Goodman, Harvey Lederman
openaire +1 more source
The Dialectic of Perspectivism, I
SATS, 2005V. Varieties of Pseudo-Kantianism As we have seen, the crucial step in Nietzsche’s argument for his early doctrine is summed by in the following remark: ‘If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms’ (1979, pp. 87–8).
openaire +1 more source