Results 141 to 150 of about 4,508,703 (295)

Theory of Sense‐Data

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data, where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception ...
Andrew Y. Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach

Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way.
David Builes, Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Gestalt Theory and Sexuality

Gestalt Theory
The understanding of sexuality (and sex therapy) depends very much on whether a more narrowly somatic or more broadly phenomenal perspective is adopted. The presentation transfers the fundamental concern of Critical Realism, namely to take a position on ...
Fuchs Thomas
doaj   +1 more source

The Gradability of ‘Conscious’

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective, meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f ...
Andrew Y. Lee, Poppy Mankowitz
wiley   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem in Indian Philosophy [PDF]

, 2018
This chapter considers the literature associated with explorations of consciousness in Indian philosophy. It focuses on a range of methodological and conceptual issues, drawing on three main sources: the naturalist theories of mind of Nyaya and Vaisesika,
Coseru, Christian
core  

Valuings as Sentiments

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We are valuing beings, beings who possess the capacity to value things. But what is it “to value” something? The most common accounts in the literature hold that to value an item is either to have a first‐order or a second‐order desire toward it; or to believe that item to be valuable; or to care about that item; or to have a combination of ...
Mauro Rossi, Christine Tappolet
wiley   +1 more source

Guessing at Ghosts in the Machine

Ratio, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT As AI grows ever more complex and ubiquitous, its moral status becomes increasingly pressing. But knowing whether an AI has moral status is only part of the ethical puzzle. To determine how we ought to treat such entities, we must know not only whether AIs have moral status, but also about the content of their interests—what contributes to ...
Helen Yetter‐Chappell
wiley   +1 more source

WHERE EXPERIENCES ARE: DUALIST, PHYSICALIST, ENACTIVE AND REFLEXIVE ACCOUNTS OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS [PDF]

, 2006
Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind ...
Velmans, Prof Max
core  

Hollow institutions: Merleau‐Ponty and the possibility of coordinated action

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract This article addresses the phenomenon of political powerlessness, understood—following Hannah Arendt—as the separation of “words and deeds,” a condition in which words become “empty” and actions lose their overall intelligibility, increasingly relying on coercion. I take up Merleau‐Ponty's phenomenology of institution to explore this condition.
Daniil Koloskov
wiley   +1 more source