Results 231 to 240 of about 4,508,703 (295)

Liberal phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Explorations, 2020
In this paper, I offer a third way in debates over the scope of phenomenal consciousness, in the form of a novel synthesis of liberal and conservative introspective observations.
Benjamin D. Storer
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Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Psychology, 2022
A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally ...
J. Hung
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Studies, 2012
Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special ...
Erhan Demircioglu
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“Phenomenal States” and the Scope of the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy

Sensations, Thoughts, Language, 2019
Brian Loar, in “Phenomenal States”, presents a compelling account of how bodily sensations and perceptual experiences could be identical with physical properties, while explaining why dualism may nonetheless exert an intuitive pull. However, while many physicalists embrace this account—now commonly called the “Phenomenal Concepts Strategy”—anti ...
J. Levin
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In Defense of Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophical Papers, 2012
Abstract In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts.
B. Veillet
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Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument

Erkenntnis, 2012
The conceivability argument against materialism, originally raised by Saul Kripke and then reformulated, among others, by David Chalmers holds that we can conceive of the distinctness of a phenomenal state and its neural realiser, or, in Chalmers’ variation of the argument, a zombie world.
Jussi Jylkkä
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Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation

Philosophia, 2023
C. D. Brown
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Phenomenal Concepts

2009
I explore various claims about the nature of phenomenal concepts and isolate two recurring intuitions. The first involves the epistemological role of phenomenal concepts: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that must be possessed by a subject who knows what it is like to have an experience of the type in question ...
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Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophy Compass, 2011
Abstract It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such.
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Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge

2007
Abstract What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This book discusses these topics. All chapters focus on consciousness in the “phenomenal” sense: looking at what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that
Torin Alter, Sven Walter
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