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Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism

Philosophical Studies, 2008
A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible.
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Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophical Psychology, 2011
S. Wilkinson
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Phenomenal Concepts

2002
AbstractExplores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.
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Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005
Over the past decade or so, David Papineau has given an account of the content and motivation of a physicalist conception of the world with more thoroughness and argumentative defence than many physicalists have thought necessary. In doing this, he has substantially advanced the debate on physicalism, and physicalists and non-physicalists alike should ...
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Phenomenal concepts in mindreading

Philosophical Psychology, 2009
In an earlier paper (Biggs, 2007) I argue that those attributing mental states sometimes simulate the phenomenal states of those to whom they are making attributions (i.e., targets). In this paper I argue that such phenomenal simulation plays an important role in some third-person mental state attributions. More specifically, I identity three important
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher-Order Experiences

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004
Relying on a range of now‐familiar thought‐experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state‐consciousness, which contrasts with creature‐consciousness, orperceptual ‐consciousness.The different forms of state‐consciousness include ...
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The Phenomenal Conception

2006
AbstractThe question “what is the problem of experience” can be divided into two: what is the topic of the problem of experience, and what problem or problems are we raising about the topic. In this chapter, the author identifies the topic: events of experience whose defining characteristic is that there is something it is like to undergo them ...
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Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception

Philosophy Compass, 2008
Abstract The concept of evidence is among the central concerns of epistemology broadly construed. As such, it has long engaged the intellectual energies of both philosophers of science and epistemologists of a more traditional variety.
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap

2011
Derk Pereboom
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2003
There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan ...
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