Results 251 to 260 of about 4,508,703 (295)

Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2008
One of the main strategies against conceivability arguments is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which aims to explain the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths in terms of the special features of phenomenal concepts. Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that the phenomenal concept strategy has failed to provide a successful ...
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Phenomenal Belief, Phenomenal Concepts, and Phenomenal Properties in a Two-Dimensional Framework

2006
Abstract Peter, who is looking at the cloudless sky during the day, and Eve, who is looking at a painting of Yves Klein, have something in common. They both have a visual experience that has a common feature with respect to the color sensation. They are both having a blue sensation.
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What Is a Phenomenal Concept?

2007
AbstractThis chapter presents a version of the phenomenal concept strategy based on a limited defense of the “demonstrative account” of phenomenal concepts. In this account, phenomenal concepts pick out their referents directly, much like demonstratives, without mediation by any mode of presentation.
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The Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

2023
Abstract This chapter discusses the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts, on which phenomenal concepts refer to non-physical properties if such properties exist and otherwise to physical properties. Hawthorne, Braddon-Mitchell, and Stalnaker argue that the conditional analysis enables physicalists to reconcile the intuitions ...
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Once More Unto the Breach: Type B Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Epistemic Gap

, 2019
J. Levin
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint

, 2018
J. Levine
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Circularity in the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

Philosophical Studies, 2013
Helen Yetter‐Chappell
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Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint

2007
AbstractThis chapter raises a problem for the phenomenal concept strategy. The problem is framed partly in terms of the explanatory gap, which is roughly the claim that the existence or nature of phenomenal consciousness cannot be completely explained in physical terms.
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The sensory basis of the epistemic gap: an alternative to phenomenal concepts

, 2016
P. Fazekas, Z. Jakab
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Phenomenal concepts and the speckled hen

, 2016
Xiaoxing Zhang
semanticscholar   +1 more source