Results 51 to 60 of about 3,955,858 (227)
Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? [PDF]
, 2016 The so-called transparency of experience (TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects.
Bordini, Davide
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A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts [PDF]
, 2014 The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions.
Fürst, Martina
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Explaining the Intuition of Revelation [PDF]
, 2020 This commentary focuses on explaining the intuition of revelation, an issue that Chalmers (2018) raises in his paper. I first sketch how the truth of revelation provides an explanation for the intuition of revelation, and then assess a physicalist ...
Liu, Michelle
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Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness [PDF]
, 2018 The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett.
Mandik, Pete
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Living existence: the emergency of non-existential phenomenon in the experience of dreamless sleep.
O Que Nos Faz Pensar, 2020 In this paper, I examine the problem of the emergence of non-existential phenomena in the field of historical existence. According to hermeneutic ontological pluralism outlined in the fundamental ontology of Being and Time, life and existence are two ...
Róbson Ramos dos Reis
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Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness [PDF]
, 2004 This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts.
Aydede, Asoc Prof Murat +1 more
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Commentary on Jakab's Ineffability of Qualia [PDF]
, 2000 Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness ...
Metzinger, Thomas
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Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach [PDF]
, 2001 This essay is a sustained information-theoretic attempt to bring new light on some of the perennial problems in the philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection.
Aydede, Murat, Guven, Guzeldere
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Ambiguous figures and the content of experience [PDF]
, 2006 Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual.
Attneave F +46 more
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Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [PDF]
, 2007 AbstractThis chapter focuses on the topic of phenomenal concepts. It develops and extends the comparison of phenomenal concepts with so-called “perceptual concepts,” to throw the nature of phenomenal concepts into clearer focus. A position against a recent argument by David Chalmers against the whole type-B strategy of defending physicalism by appeal ...
openaire +1 more source