Results 81 to 90 of about 3,955,858 (227)

Moral Experience: Its Existence, Describability, and Significance [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
One of the newest research areas in moral philosophy is moral phenomenology: the dedicated study of the experiential dimension of moral mental life. The idea has been to bring phenomenological evidence to bear on some central issues in metaethics and ...
Kriegel, Uriah
core  

Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts

open access: yesMind and Language, 2005
A phenomenal concept is the concept of a particular type of sensory or perceptual experience, where the notion of experience is understood phenomenologi- cally. A recent and increasingly influential idea in philosophy of mind suggests that reflection on these concepts will play a major role in the debate about conscious experience, and in particular in
openaire   +2 more sources

Phenomenal Privacy, Similarity and Communicability [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
The idea that there are features of or in our conscious experience that are, in some important sense, private has both a long history in philosophy and a large measure of intuitive attraction. Once this idea is in place, it will be very natural to assume
Raleigh, Thomas
core   +1 more source

Phenomenal knowledge why: the explanatory knowledge argument against physicalism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
Phenomenal knowledge is knowledge of what it is like to be in conscious states, such as seeing red or being in pain. According to the knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986), phenomenal knowledge is knowledge that, i.e., knowledge of phenomenal facts ...
Mørch, Hedda Hassel
core  

Illusionism and the Epistemological Problems Facing Phenomenal Realism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
Illusionism about phenomenal properties has the potential to leave us with all the benefit of taking consciousness seriously and far fewer problems than those accompanying phenomenal realism.
Ross, Amber
core  

What We Can Learn about Phenomenal Concepts from Wittgenstein’s Private Language

open access: yesNordic Wittgenstein Review, 2016
This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s ...
Roberto Sá Pereira
doaj  

Natural self-interest, interactive representation, and the emergence of objects and Umwelt: An outline of basic semiotic concepts for biosemiotics

open access: yesSign Systems Studies, 2003
In biosemiotics, life and living phenomena are described by means of originally anthropomorphic semiotic concepts. This can be justified if we can show that living systems as self-maintaining far from equilibrium systems create and update some kind of ...
Tommi Vehkavaara
doaj   +1 more source

Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation [PDF]

open access: yes, 2008
Currently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher-order-thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one-component and a two-component view.
Lane, Timothy, Liang, Caleb
core   +3 more sources

The Mathematical Basis of the Phenomenal World [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Investigations
In the Critique of Pure Reason Immanuel Kant said that cognition (objective perception) is acquired in the unity of sensibility (the receptivity of the mind to receive empirical representations of things, which yields intuitions) and the understanding ...
Bernard Riley
doaj   +1 more source

Truth in Being and Time and the original place of truth

open access: yesPensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica, 2016
In Being and Time an effort is carried out in order to elucidate the original meaning of understanding, truth, phenomenon and phenomenology. The way these fundamental concepts are determined depends on the ecstatic-horizontal conception of the original ...
José Ruiz Fernández
doaj  

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