Results 131 to 140 of about 70,610 (286)
Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity [PDF]
, 2019 I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities.
Schellenberg, Susanna
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Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT I develop and defend a sense‐datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense‐datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense‐data, where sense‐data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception ...
Andrew Y. Lee
wiley +1 more source
E-Phisicalism - A Phisicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Ideas y Valores, 2013 El libro E-physicalism - A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness presenta una teoría en el área de la metafísica de la conciencia fenomenal. Está basada en las convicciones de que la experiencia subjetiva –en el sentido de Nagel (1974)– es un ...
Reinaldo Bernal +4 more
doaj
The self and conscious experience
Frontiers in PsychologyThe primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S.
Giorgio Marchetti
doaj +1 more source
Why are identity disorders interesting for philosophers? [PDF]
, 2003 "Identity disorders" constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms ofself-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients' phenomenal experience of their own personal identity.
Metzinger, Thomas
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Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach
Analytic Philosophy, EarlyView.ABSTRACT What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? While it is popular to think that our most basic conscious experiences are temporally extended, we will be arguing against this view, on the grounds that it makes our conscious experiences depend on the future in an implausible way.
David Builes +1 more
wiley +1 more source
The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness [PDF]
, 2015 The scientific study of consciousness is constantly making new discoveries, but one particular aspect of consciousness remains problematic to explain. This is the fact that conscious experiences present themselves to us in a first-person way: there is something it feels like to be the subject of a conscious experience.
openaire +1 more source
Ratio, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Most naïve realists do not distinguish between perception and consciousness; to say that I perceive the table is akin to saying that I am conscious of the table. Doing so leads many to maintain that if the character of experience is constituted by anything other than the table, I do not perceive it, and so naïve realism fails.
R. P. Koutedakis
wiley +1 more source
Studia Semiotyczne, 2019 DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi1.05 The paper discusses possible roles of consciousness in a semiotic (meaning-making) activity of a cognitive agent.
Piotr Konderak
doaj
Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality [PDF]
, 2019 This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell’s theory of acquaintance.
Bourget, David
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