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Hallucinations and Phenomenal Consciousness
2019This chapter examines whether hallucinations are related to the problem of phenomenal consciousness and how historical contributions to the phenomenology of hallucinations, notably the Early Heidelberg School (1909–1932), shed light on hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Aaron Mishara, Yuliya Zaytseva
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Reflective Consciousness, Phenomenalism, Epiphenomenalism
2014Nietzsche develops negative arguments against conscious subject things, against the existence of certain species of consciousness perennially popular with philosophers, and against views of consciousness that fail to acknowledge its embodiment. He also argues positively that where it is discovered, reflective consciousness exists only as a property of ...
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Hill on phenomenal consciousness
Philosophical Studies, 2015I argue that it is at least open to a proponent of type materialism for phenomenal consciousness to accept Hill’s representational theory of experiential awareness of perceptual qualia.
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Embodiment and Phenomenal Consciousness
2021Can the imaginary brains described in Chapter 1 have only representations of perceived patterns, objects, and events? Can hierarchical structures of neurons also represent feelings, beliefs, emotions, and other higher mental states? Creating feelings requires giving emotional perceptions, memories, plans, beliefs, and intentions.
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Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness
Vivarium, 2014The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it.
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Consciousness as phenomenal ether?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2003The Gestalt Bubble model of visual consciousness is a courageous attempt to take the first-person perspective as primary in the study of consciousness. I have developed similar ideas as the Virtual Reality Metaphor of consciousness (Revonsuo 1995; 2000).
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On explaining phenomenal consciousness
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2003Over the last two decades, doubts have been expressed about the adequacy of materialism as the correct framework for explaining phenomenal consciousness (the experience of saturated greenness one has when looking at a lush lawn, for example). This paper reconstructs a generic form of the various arguments that have been used to defend the view of the ...
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Phenomenal consciousness and language
2000In the present chapter I shall argue that the simple form of dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory of phenomenal consciousness defended in chapters 8 and 9 is preferable to three other similar but more elaborate accounts (put forward by Carruthers, 1996a; Dennett, 1978; and Dennett, 1991 respectively).
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