Results 241 to 250 of about 70,610 (286)
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Phenomenal and access consciousness in olfaction
Consciousness and Cognition, 2009Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal (P)/access (A) distinction, are examined relative to the major senses.
Richard J Stevenson
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Consciousness, Phenomenal Consciousness, and Free Will
2023No description ...
Sytsma, Justin, Snater, M
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On explaining phenomenal consciousness
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2003Over the last two decades, doubts have been expressed about the adequacy of materialism as the correct framework for explaining phenomenal consciousness (the experience of saturated greenness one has when looking at a lush lawn, for example). This paper reconstructs a generic form of the various arguments that have been used to defend the view of the ...
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Phenomenalism and Consciousness
2022AbstractChapter 8 offers a phenomenalist perspective on the problem of consciousness, arguing that phenomenalism faciliates a more satisfying view of the relationship between mind and body than we can obtain on any other terms.
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Electrophysiological evidence for phenomenal consciousness
Cognitive Neuroscience, 2010Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset.
Antti, Revonsuo, Mika, Koivisto
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Phenomenal consciousness lite: No thanks!
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007AbstractThe target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal.
O'Regan, J. Kevin, Myin, Erik
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2010
How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in ones experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain.
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How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials (nerve impulses) become like the feeling of pain in ones experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain.
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Binding and the Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
Consciousness and Cognition, 1999The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem.
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2000
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious.
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How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious.
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Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness
Vivarium, 2014The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it.
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