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Where Does the Knowledge Argument Go Wrong?
In his well-known Knowledge Argument (KA) Frank Jackson attempted to show that physicalism is false by offering a case that allegedly showed that a complete physicalist description of the world leaves something crucial out, namely the phenomenal ...
Fernando Rudy Hiller
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The authors propose that the theoretical framework of Western philosophy is supported by metaphysical ontology through the differentiation and analysis of two different kinds of “particulars-universals” in Plato’s “world visible to the naked eye” and ...
Wei Yan, Xia Wang, Zongrong Li
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El presente trabajo trata de esclarecer el sentido en que puede considerarse que Wittgenstein es un fisicalista, es decir, un creyente en la tesis de que el discurso científico con significado cognitivo consiste, en ultima instancia, en proposiciones ...
Rudolf Haller
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There IS a Question of Physicalism
The most common catchphrase of physicalism is: “everything is physical”. According to Hempel’s Dilemma, however, physicalism is an ill-formed thesis because it can offer no account of the physics to which it refers: current physics will definitely be ...
Orli Dahan
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Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith [PDF]
Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be.
Hornsby, Jennifer
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The Modal Argument and a Rejoinder to Contingent Physicalism
Since the time of Descartes, various versions of a modal argument have been proffered for substance dualism. Until recently, the premise most frequently attacked is one that moves from conceivability to metaphysical possibility.
James Moreland
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Misha Shifman knows much more about conformal symmetry than I do, but I have been thinking hard about it, and I thought it would be fun to present some of my ideas as a little birthday present.
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Physicalism or Anti-physicalism: A Disjunctive Account
AbstractIn this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances.
Baysan, E, Wildman, N
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism [PDF]
Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind ...
Al-Ghazālī. +209 more
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PAREITIS, FIZIKALISTINĖ REDUKCIJA IR PERKEISTOS KOKYBĖS
Funkcinės psichinių savybių analizės atveriama jų materialiojo įkūnijimo įvairovės galimybė verčia materialistinį monizmą sąmonės filosofijoje formuluoti ne psichinių ir fizinių savybių tapatumo, bet pirmųjų pareities nuo antrųjų tezę.
Jonas Dagys
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