Results 91 to 100 of about 158,318 (157)
In February respondents were questioned whether they trust to selected politicians. They were shown a list with names of top politicians - members of Government,president, chairmen of Senate and Chamber of Deputies, leaders of Parties present in ...
Kunštát, Daniel
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Conceptual metaphors in South African political speeches (1994 – 2001)
Malan, Saskia
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Politicians: Vocation, profession and history [PDF]
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Celebrity 'outsider' politicians in the digital realm: Donald Trump's online charismatic authority
Celebrity 'Outsider' Politicians in the Digital Realm: Donald Trump's Online Charismatic Authority considers Trump’s impact on elite level behaviour by analysing how his extremist online political discourses shape communications outputs.
Wheeler, Mark
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Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, his personality and his politics
S.M. Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, his personality and his politics, Karachi, Oxford University Press pp 412 Rs. 495/-.
S.M. Burke, Salim Al-Din Quraishi
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We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to remain clueless about the merits of reform, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless.
Christopher Cotton, Cheng Li
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Journal of Public Economics, 2010
In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
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In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
openaire +6 more sources
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
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Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
openaire +2 more sources

