Results 251 to 260 of about 194,833 (307)
'Just saying it like it is': A comparative study on the characterizations of Chris Christie and Donald Trump as <i>tough-guy</i> politicians. [PDF]
Lang Lit (Harlow)Bourgeois S.
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Yonder: Working rurally, pain-related distress, access and experience, and tailored public health messaging. [PDF]
Br J Gen PractBurrell A.
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Public health authorities in Germany during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic - a constructive-critical reflection. [PDF]
GMS Hyg Infect ControlHeudorf U, Gottschalk R.
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015 We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to remain clueless about the merits of reform, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless.
Christopher Cotton, Cheng Li
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Journal of Public Economics, 2010
In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
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In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
openaire +6 more sources
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
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Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
openaire +2 more sources