Results 251 to 260 of about 139,634 (314)

Clueless Politicians [PDF]

open access: possibleSSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to remain clueless about the merits of reform, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless.
Christopher Cotton, Cheng Li
openaire   +2 more sources
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

The parody of politicians

2013 IEEE 4th International Conference on Cognitive Infocommunications (CogInfoCom), 2013
The paper presents a model of parody, seen as distorted imitation of some object or person aimed at eliciting laughter. A qualitative analysis is presented of the parody of a politician by a comedian. The analysis is carried out through an annotation scheme that describes each sentence, gesture, gaze, facial expression of the parody, and finds out the ...
Francesca D'Errico, Isabella Poggi
openaire   +1 more source

Economists and politicians

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1986
THE ROLE OF THE POLICY ADVISER Why do politicians hire advisers? The first step toward answering this question is a recognition that the focus of political choices is among alternative laws, regulations, administrative orders, and other formal statements of policy, but, in many cases, the primary concern is with the effects of these choices.
openaire   +1 more source

Moonlighting politicians

Journal of Public Economics, 2010
In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci   +2 more
openaire   +6 more sources

Politicians and Firms

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
openaire   +2 more sources

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy