Results 201 to 210 of about 47,111 (267)
Publics and UK parliamentarians underestimate the urgency of peaking global greenhouse gas emissions. [PDF]
Commun Earth EnvironKenny J, Geese L.
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Accelerating Nigeria towards malaria elimination requires moving away from business as usual: insights from a political economy analysis. [PDF]
Int HealthChestnutt EG +7 more
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Renewed mandate for Schools of Public Health: a call to action. [PDF]
BMJ Public HealthRahman-Shepherd A +7 more
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Building confidence in crises - the roles of Sierra Leonean religious leaders' during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak. [PDF]
Glob Health ActionLyons P +4 more
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015 We develop a model of policymaking in which a politician decides how much expertise to acquire or how informed to become about issues before interest groups engage in monetary lobbying. For a range of issues, the policymaker prefers to remain clueless about the merits of reform, even when acquiring expertise or better information is costless.
Christopher Cotton, Cheng Li
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Journal of Public Economics, 2010
In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
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In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life.
S. Gagliarducci +2 more
openaire +6 more sources
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994
Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
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Summary: We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model.
Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.
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Politicians Are Not Technologists: Technologists Are Not Politicians
Issues in Engineering: Journal of Professional Activities, 1982The view that there are too few engineers in the legislative branch of government is confirmed. It is argued that the lack of scientists and engineers in elected public offices creates an imbalance of professional perspectives which will affect decision making on public policy on technological issues ranging from engineering education to advanced ...
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