Results 211 to 220 of about 1,091 (259)

Semantics, possible worlds

2018
Possible worlds semantics (PWS) is a family of ideas and methods that have been used to analyse concepts of philosophical interest. PWS was originally focused on the important concepts of necessity and possibility. Consider: - Necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4. - Necessarily, Socrates had a snub nose. Intuitively, (a) is true but (b) is
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The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2002
In the article the author gives an interesting survey of the development of possible worlds semantics starting from the works of Wittgenstein (1913-1921), through the contribution of such authors as Feys, McKinsey, Carnap, von Wright and others, up to Bayart, Drake and -- of course -- Kripke (1958-1965). The early prehistory of this theory (in works of
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Modal Fictionalism Cannot Deliver Possible Worlds Semantics

Analysis, 1995
[1] Hartry Field, Realism, Mathematics and Modality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). [2] Bob Hale, 'Modal fictionalism: a simple dilemma', Analysis this issue 63-67. [3] Peter Menzies and Philip Pettit, 'in defence of fictionalism about possible worlds' Analysis 54 (1994) 27-36. [4] Gideon Rosen, 'Modal fictionalism', Mind 99 (1990) 327-54. [5] Gideon Rosen,
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Possible-Worlds Semantics Without Possible Worlds: The Agnostic Approach

Mind, 2006
If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible ...
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Possible worlds semantics for predicates

2017
IF rectangle is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where rectangle is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate
Leitgeb, H, Welch, PD, Halbach, V
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Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics

1984
Our discussion of Husserl’s theory of intentionality has focused on two important notions and their role in the theory: the notions of meaning (or noema) and horizon. In Chapters III and IV our development of Husserl’s theory assumed — along with Husserl — a generally Fregean account of meaning.
David Woodruff Smith, Ronald McIntyre
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Modal semantics without possible worlds

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1981
In this paper I will develop a semantic account for modal logic by considering only the values of sentences (and formulas). This account makes no use of possible worlds. To develop such an account, we must recognize four values. These are obtained by subdividing (plain) truth into necessary truth (T) and contingent truth (t); and by subdividing falsity
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Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics

Erkenntnis, 2010
Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation.
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Possible Worlds and Formal Semantics

1979
Since Prof. Hintikka is one of those philosophers and logicians who are responsible for the popularity of possible worlds, and in view of his pioneering work on the methodology of the semantics of modal notions, it is perhaps understandable that my contribution to his Festschrift concerns possible worlds, too, no matter how amateurish it may be.
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Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals

The Philosophical Review, 2012
Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal
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