Results 1 to 10 of about 43,633 (89)

Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games [PDF]

open access: yes, 1995
Games associated to congestion situations a la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we will provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games.
Facchini, G.
openaire   +2 more sources

Computation and efficiency of potential function minimizers of combinatorial congestion games [PDF]

open access: yesMathematical Programming, 2020
AbstractWe study the computation and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria in combinatorial congestion games, where the strategies of each player i are given by the binary vectors of a polytope $$P_i$$ P i .
Kleer, P., Schäfer, G.
openaire   +3 more sources

Multi-agent reinforcement learning for traffic congestion on one-way multi-lane highways

open access: yesJournal of Information and Telecommunication, 2023
In the last decade, agent-based modelling and simulation has emerged as a potential approach to study complex systems in the real world, such as traffic congestion.
Nguyen-Tuan-Thanh Le
doaj   +1 more source

An optimized framework for VANET routing: A multi-objective hybrid model for data synchronization with digital twin

open access: yesInternational Journal of Intelligent Networks, 2023
The utilization of Digital Twin technology allows for the simulation of network behavior, anticipating traffic surges, and implementing efficient traffic routing strategies to prevent congestion.
Madhuri Husan Badole   +1 more
doaj   +1 more source

CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Game Theory Review, 1999
In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973).
Voorneveld, M.   +4 more
openaire   +8 more sources

CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES [PDF]

open access: yesTheory and Decision, 1997
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Facchini, G.   +3 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Equilibrium and potential in coalitional congestion games [PDF]

open access: yesTheory and Decision, 2013
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case that some players cooperatively decide on their joint action in order to maximize the coalition's total utility ...
Kuniavsky, Sergey, Smorodinsky, Rann
openaire   +3 more sources

Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
We introduce a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical order of a certain function defined on the set of strategy ...
Harks, Tobias   +2 more
core   +3 more sources

Pervasive Gaming as a Potential Solution to Traffic Congestion: New Challenges Regarding Ethics, Privacy and Trust [PDF]

open access: yes, 2012
The following paper presents a review of the ethical, privacy and trust aspects relating to pervasive gaming in particular within the domain of traffic congestion. The paper deals explicitly with the challenges involved that fall between the gaps standard ethical practice and scientific research when studies comprise of those in the lab (where ...
Koenig, Vincent   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Price of Anarchy in Bernoulli Congestion Games with Affine Costs

open access: yes, 2021
We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in[0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost.
Cominetti, Roberto   +3 more
core   +1 more source

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