Results 11 to 20 of about 250,500 (300)
Optimal Incentives in a Principal–Agent Model with Endogenous Technology [PDF]
Games, 2018 One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a ...
Marco A. Marini +3 more
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Bounded Rationality in Principal-Agent Relationships [PDF]
German Economic Review, 2017 AbstractWe conducted six treatments of a standard moral hazard experiment with hidden action. The behavior in all treatments and periods was inconsistent with established agency theory. In the early periods, behavior differed significantly between treatments. This difference largely vanished in the final periods.
Mathias Erlei, Heike Schenk-Mathes
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Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting [PDF]
Econometrica, 1985 In a repeated principal-agent game (supergame) in which each player's criterion is his long-run average expected utility, efficient behavior can be sustained by a Nash equilibrium if it is Pareto-superior to a one- period Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if the players discount future expected utilities, then for every positive epsilon, and every pair of
R. Radner
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The Principal-Agent Matching Market [PDF]
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2003 Abstract We propose an agency model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes (equilibria) of this market.
Kaniska Dam, David Pérez-Castrillo
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A principal-agent model of corruption [PDF]
, 1996 One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one ...
Groenendijk, Nico
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Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models [PDF]
, 2004 This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal.
Roland Strausz
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Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, 2018 Fourteen Slovak state-owned enterprises were studied, using published data and structured interviews with management. A novel methodology is used to assess SOE autonomy, effectiveness, accountability and governance.
Brinčíková Zuzana +3 more
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The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
The Review of Economic Studies, 1988 Summary: In repeated principal-agent models, long-term contracts can improve on short-term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoof in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short-term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs.
Malcomson, J, Spinnewyn, F
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Obligations and Penalties under Lemon Laws: Automobiles versus Tractors
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1995 Distinctive new provisions of tractor lemon laws which create obligations and provide penalties for defective self-propelled agricultural equipment are contrasted with provisions of automobile lemon laws.
Terence J. Centner, Michael E. Wetzstein
doaj +1 more source