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Optimal Incentives in a Principal–Agent Model with Endogenous Technology [PDF]

open access: yesGames, 2018
One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a ...
Marco A. Marini   +3 more
doaj   +5 more sources

A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing [PDF]

open access: yesTheoretical Economics, 2008
This paper analyzes the optimal provision of incentives in a sequential testing context. In every period the agent can acquire costly information that is relevant to the principal's decision. Neither the agent's effort nor the realizations of his signals
Dino Gerardi, Lucas Maestri
core   +19 more sources

A principal-agent model of corruption [PDF]

open access: yesCrime, Law and Social Change, 1996
One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one ...
Groenendijk, Nico
core   +5 more sources

Imprecise Beliefs in a Principal Agent Model [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
This paper presents a principal-agent model where the agent has multiple, or imprecise, beliefs. We model this situation formally by assuming the agent's preferences are incomplete.
Rigotti, L.
core   +6 more sources

Reinvention and the Principal-Agent Model

open access: yesConvergencia, 2003
Existe una interesante polémica en el sector público, derivada de las tensiones existentes entre desempeño y flexibilidad administrativa por un lado, y rendición de cuentas y control, por el otro.
J. Ramón Gil García
doaj   +1 more source

The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference

open access: yesAIMS Mathematics, 2021
The fairness preference in the principal-agent relationship is a vital factor that can even determine the success or failure of one program. Under normal circumstances, the capital invested by VC is often several times that of EN, which is one of the ...
Dongsheng Xu, Qingqing Liu , Xin Jiang
doaj   +1 more source

The Principal-Agent Model with an Informative Signal to the Advantage of the Agent [PDF]

open access: yesProblemi Ekonomiki, 2019
This article deals with the problem of negative impact of information asymmetry on the market and methods for mitigating it. This problem is solved by using the methods of the economic theory of contracts.
Nykyforchyn Iryna V.
doaj   +1 more source

Optimization of Upstream Oil and Gas Contracts: A Principal-Agent Model [PDF]

open access: yesFaslnāmah-i Pizhūhish/Nāmah-i Iqtisādī, 2020
The history of oil contracts in the last century indicates that oil contracts are a form of conflict between the interests of foreign oil companies and national interests of reservoir-owning governments.
Hojjatollah Baramaki Yazdi   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Understanding how heterogeneous agents affect Principal's returns: Perspectives from short-termism and Bayesian learning

open access: yesJournal of Management Science and Engineering, 2023
We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's ...
Chuan Ding, Yang Li, Zhenyu Cui
doaj   +1 more source

Research on the Principal–Agent Mechanism of Poverty Alleviation through Mandarin Popularization in Ethnic Minority Areas from the Perspective of Ability Incentive

open access: yesSystems, 2022
In the process of poverty alleviation through Mandarin popularization in ethnic minority areas, there is a principal–agent relationship. In order to effectively stimulate the endogenous motivation of the public, it is necessary to study the principal ...
Xiaoyang Mu, Li Wang
doaj   +1 more source

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