Results 231 to 240 of about 403,862 (289)
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ENDOGENOUS SPECIALISATION AND ENDOGENOUS PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
Australian Economic Papers, 2002The paper develops a general equilibrium model with endogenous principal‐agent relationship within a framework of consumer‐producer, economies of specialisation, and transaction costs. It is shown that if transaction efficiency is low, then autarky is chosen as the general equilibrium where no market and principal‐agent relationship exists.
Xiaokai Yang, Yeong‐nan Yeh
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The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
Econometrica, 1992Summary: [For the first part see the authors, Econometrica 58, No. 2, 379-409 (1990; Zbl 0728.90107).] In many circumstances, a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent. We analyze such a principal- agent relationship as a noncooperative game.
Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean
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A reexamination of the principal-agent relationship in politics
Journal of Public Economics, 1994Abstract That senators from the same state often have a large difference in their ideological voting records has proven inconvenient for a literature that has largely relied on a median voter model of elections. One exception is Palfrey ( Review of Economic Studies , 1984, 51, 139–156), whose analysis implies the hypothesis that the expected ...
Bruce Bender
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Technology in Society, 2020
With the advent of artificial intelligence, stakeholders and experts cede their policy decisions for human affairs to computer algorithms in algorithmic governance.
Eun-Sung Kim
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With the advent of artificial intelligence, stakeholders and experts cede their policy decisions for human affairs to computer algorithms in algorithmic governance.
Eun-Sung Kim
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The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
Econometrica, 1990We analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three-stage noncooperative game: contract proposal, acceptance/refusal, and contract execution. We assume that the information does not directly affect the agent's payoff (private values). Equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique.
Maskin, Eric, Tirole, Jean
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Optimal employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1983Abstract Two unique characteristics of modern Japanese labor management practice are the prevalence of lifetime employment and of biannual bonuses. In contrast these practices are relatively infrequent in the United States. Many of the explanations offered so far attribute the difference to cultural, and/or institutional differences in the two ...
Frank H. Clarke, Masako N. Darrough
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Fair Offers in a Repeated Principal–Agent Relationship with Hidden Actions
Economica, 2005We test a repeated principal–agent relationship with hidden actions in the laboratory. At each period, the principal offers payments to the agent in order to induce him to provide the high effort level. The agent can accept or reject the offer; if he accepts it, he can choose the high or the low effort level. We observe that offered payments are higher
Cochard, Francois, Willinger, Marc
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The Economics of Organization: The Principal-Agent Relationship
Acta Sociologica, 1993Trond Petersen
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A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021Summary: This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal's payoff depends only on the \textit{payoff} to the agent and her type.
Vohra, Rajiv +2 more
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