Results 261 to 270 of about 658,976 (287)

A Principal-Agent Relationship with No Advantage to Commitment

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
Summary: This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal's payoff depends only on the \textit{payoff} to the agent and her type.
Vohra, Rajiv, Espinosa, Francisco, Ray, Debray   +2 more
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Psychiatrists’ Relationships with Industry: The Principal-Agent Problem

Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 2010
Psychiatrists' relationships with the pharmaceutical and device industries have been a growing focus of attention, with questions raised about the impact of those relationships on prescribing practices, diagnostic criteria, practice guidelines, continuing education, conduct and reporting of research, and patients' and public trust.
Paul S, Appelbaum, Azgad, Gold
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Cost Sharing in Principal Agent Relationships

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
Why and how do contracting parties share variable or fixed costs? How are revenue and cost sharing agreements affected by an expectation of premature termination? How will fixed costs be shared if dissolution occurs without prior notice? These and other elated questions have been examined utilizing a synthetic principal agent framework.
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Bargaining power and efficiency in principal-agent relationships [PDF]

, 2003
Insurance contracts are frequently modelled as principal--agent relationships. Although it is commonly assumed that the principal, in this case the insurer, has complete freedom to design the contract, the problem formulation in much of the principal--agent literature presumes that the contract is constrained-Pareto-efficient.
John Quiggin, Robert G. Chambers
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An experimental study of a dynamic principal–agent relationship

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1998
The principal–agent problem is often illustrated by the relationship between owners and managers in modern corporations. Our experimental study considers the problem where the owner has to motivate the manager by an employment contract serving the owner's interest.
Werner Güth, Wolfgang Klose, Manfred Königstein, Joachim Schwalbach   +3 more
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Fiduciary Obligation in Principal Agent Relationship

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
The concept of fiduciary relations and related obligations are as ancient as that of law and jurisprudence. Fiduciary duties might be said to grow out of a variety of relationships involving one party's exercise of some measure of control. One of the major areas where Fiduciary relations are of important essence is that of Agency.
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Benchmarking applications in public sector principal‐agent relationships

Benchmarking: An International Journal, 2008
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.Design/methodology/approachCollection and critical analysis of secondary data from relevant publications addressing applications of benchmarking in the public sector ...
Bjørn Andersen, Bjørnar Henriksen, Ingrid Spjelkavik   +2 more
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Decision Support in Principal-Agent-Relationships

2011
In this chapter we propose control strategies that adjust their decision behavior to the current process performance and/or to the state of the dynamic process environment. We propose an automatic re-configuration of the process control system by changing the process decision model maintained by the used DSS.
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Optimal employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1983
Abstract Two unique characteristics of modern Japanese labor management practice are the prevalence of lifetime employment and of biannual bonuses. In contrast these practices are relatively infrequent in the United States. Many of the explanations offered so far attribute the difference to cultural, and/or institutional differences in the two ...
Frank H. Clarke, Masako N. Darrough
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Using Different Budgeting Procedures to Coordinate Principal-Agent Relationships

SSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
Principal-Agent models consider vertical coordination problems within a firm, when there is a trade-off between efficient risk-sharing and efficient incentives to work. One reason of the agency problem is the activity set available to the agent and the principal's inability to costlessly observe the agent's action choice.
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