Results 31 to 40 of about 403,862 (289)

Incentive Mechanism Analysis of Environmental Governance Using Multitask Principal–Agent Model

open access: yesSustainability, 2023
In view of the principal–agent relationship between local government and pollution enterprise in environmental governance, this paper established a multitask principal–agent model, gave the optimal contract form of local government incentive to ...
Lin Wang, Feng Pan
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Economic Perspectives, 1991
This article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives. The article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems. Next, the principal's optimal response to these frictions is explored, taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts ...
openaire   +2 more sources

Candidate Selection and Parliamentary Activity in the EU’s Multi-Level System: Opening a Black-Box

open access: yesPolitics and Governance, 2020
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a multitude of parliamentary duties and, accordingly, have to prioritize some parliamentary activities over others. So far, we know comparably little about this prioritization process.
Eva-Maria Euchner, Elena Frech
doaj   +1 more source

The European Central Bank and the German Constitutional Court: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms

open access: yesPolitics and Governance, 2021
In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s participation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme.
Clément Fontan, David Howarth
doaj   +1 more source

Principal-agent relationships on the stewardship-agency axis

open access: yesNonprofit Management and Leadership, 2006
This article provides an overview of the literature on nonprofit principal-agent relationships. It depicts the nature of agency theory and stewardship theory, analyzes the origin of their struggle within the nonprofit structure, and marks directions for a conciliatory approach.
Caers, Ralf   +5 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Walking a Tightrope: Navigating Principal-Agent Dilemmas in Research-Practice Partnerships

open access: yesEducational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 2023
Although research alliances (RAs) have long been seen as mutualistic and reciprocal, RAs face numerous obstacles navigating stakeholders’ differing goals, incentives, and information.
Megan Duff   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Agent–Principal Dilemma and the EU Chemical Management

open access: yesBaltic Journal of European studies, 2018
In 2007, the EU adopted the most comprehensive chemical regulation in the world. The so-called REACH requires all chemical producers and importers to register and evaluate their chemical products and, when necessary, replace them with safer alternatives.
Filipec Ondřej
doaj   +1 more source

Can Citizens Affect the Performance of Their Elected Representatives? A Principal–Agent Model of Strategic Interaction in Democratic Systems

open access: yesMathematics, 2020
According to standard economic theory, human beings are expected to work more and better when benefits in the form of lower costs or higher reward increase.
Giuseppe Lanza   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Quasi-regulation and Principal—Agent Relationships [PDF]

open access: yesEducational Management Administration & Leadership, 2009
Market-oriented reforms and school choice policies have had a high political profile in a number of developed countries. This article examines the issue of school choice through the lens of the English market-oriented reforms; it focuses on the quasi-regulation and regulation of admissions to publicly funded secondary schools. It examines admissions to
Anne West, Hazel Pennell, Audrey Hind
openaire   +1 more source

Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship

open access: yes, 2010
Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct responsibility for selfish or unethical behavior.
John R. Hamman   +2 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

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