Results 51 to 60 of about 377 (170)
Topics in set theory: Lebesgue measurability, large cardinals, forcing axioms, rho-functions
During the Fall Semester of 1987, Stevo Todorcevic gave a series of lectures at the University of Colorado. These notes of the course, taken by the author, give a novel and fast exposition of four chapters of Set Theory.
Bekkali, Mohamed
core +1 more source
Forcing axioms and the complexity of non-stationary ideals. [PDF]
Cox S, Lücke P.
europepmc +1 more source
Why Are All the Sets All the Sets?
ABSTRACT Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur‐Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory.
Tim Button
wiley +1 more source
A new axiom is proposed, the Ground Axiom, asserting that the universe is not a nontrivial set-forcing extension of any inner model. The Ground Axiom is first-order expressible, and any model of ZFC has a class-forcing extension which satisfies it.
Reitz, Jonas
core
From Moral Supervenience to Moral Contingentism (In One Easy Step!)
ABSTRACT According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal and Risberg 2020) for explaining moral supervenience, the modal covariation between moral and natural properties can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails.
Alexios Stamatiadis‐Bréhier
wiley +1 more source
Forcing notions in inner models
There is a partial order P preserving stationary subsets of ? and forcing that every partial order in the ground model V that collapses a sufficiently large ordinal to ? over V also collapses ? over V.
Asperó, D.
core +1 more source
On the Naturalistic Grounds of Grounding
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether grounding can be naturalized. We adopt a tripartite framework—Ocat (scientific catalogue of existents), Otyp (ontological types), and metaphysics (natures/modal profiles)—and show that classifying as such the relata of putative grounding claims forces a dilemma.
Raoni Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart
wiley +1 more source
Two adequacy conditions on a minimalist account of truth dependence
Abstract According to Aristotle's Categories (14b14–22), the proposition that p is true because p, but it is not the case that p because the proposition that p is true. Call this truth dependence. Truth dependence is challenging for Horwich's minimalism.
Susanna Melkonian‐Altshuler
wiley +1 more source
Categorical Smoothness of 4-Manifolds from Quantum Symmetries and the Information Loss Paradox. [PDF]
Król J, Asselmeyer-Maluga T.
europepmc +1 more source
Woodin Cardinals and the Consistency Strength of the Proper Forcing Axiom
We establish the lower bound consistency strength of the Proper Forcing Axiom by constructing a canonical inner model with a Woodin cardinal from the failure of square principles.
Revista, Zen, MFC, 10
openaire +1 more source

