Results 181 to 190 of about 5,104 (213)

Interdependence explains how and when crises impact social cohesion. [PDF]

Commun Psychol
Koster J, Lang M, Van Lange PAM.
europepmc   +1 more source

Probabilistic participation in public goods games [PDF]

Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2007
Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed ...
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Tatsuo Unemi   +2 more
exaly   +3 more sources

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Mixing protocols in the public goods game

Physical Review E, 2020
If interaction partners in social dilemma games are not selected randomly from the population but are instead determined by a network of contacts, it has far reaching consequences for the evolutionary dynamics. Selecting partners randomly leads to a well-mixed population, where pattern formation is essentially impossible.
Maja Duh, Marko Gosak, Matjaž Perc
openaire   +2 more sources

Commitment and Participation in Public Goods Games

International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2017
Before engaging in a group venture agents may seek to secure commitments from other members of the group, and based on the level of participation (i.e. how many group members commit) they can then decide whether it is worth-while joining the group effort [12, 1, 5].
Han, The Ann, Luis Moniz, Pereira, Lenaerts, Tom   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

The individual behaviour in a public goods game [PDF]

International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, 2005
Generally, with a standard linear public goods game, one observes at the aggregate level that contributions lay between the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum and decrease over time with and end-effect. The purpose of this paper is to see whether these general aggregate results remain available at the group and at the individual levels.
openaire   +1 more source

Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games

Computational Economics, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Clemens, Christiane, Riechmann, Thomas
openaire   +3 more sources

The timing effect in public good games

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2005
In public good situations, expectations concerning other persons' moves are important and subtle cues can affect these expectations. In Experiment 1, participants in a public good game who moved simultaneously made high contributions and expected their opponents to make high contributions.
Abele, S., Ehrhart, K.-M.
openaire   +1 more source

Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game

Journal of Economic Theory, 2019
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Ratul Lahkar, Saptarshi Mukherjee
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Efficient Equilibria in a Public Goods Game

2015 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2015
The "best-shot" public goods game is a network game, defined on a social network. As in most strategic games, it contains a structured tradeoff between stability and efficiency. The present study considers a multi-agent system, in which each agent represents a player in the "best-shot" game.
Zohar Komarovsky, Vadim Levit 0001, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels   +3 more
openaire   +1 more source