Results 81 to 90 of about 2,265 (182)
Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo [PDF]
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A Coliva +17 more
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Epistemic austerity: limits to entitlement. [PDF]
Ohlhorst J.
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Scetticismo e ricerca della verità. Nota sul termine ζήτησις in Sesto Empirico [PDF]
This paper argues that Sceptic philosophers’ search for the truth is different from the Dogmatic one: the Sceptics indeed investigate the truth of Dogmatic philosophers’ theories.
Catapano, Massimo
core
Montaigne faz um ataque pirrônico ao conceito acadêmico de verossimilhança ou probabilidade na Apologia de Raymond Sebond. O ataque é paradoxal porque Montaigne parece seguir o verossímil na própria Apologia e em diversos outros ensaios.
José R. Maia Neto
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The hardness of the iconic must: Can Peirce’s existential graphs assist modal epistemology? [PDF]
Charles Peirce’s diagrammatic logic - the Existential Graphs - is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf’s famous challenge that most “semantics for mathematics” do not “fit an acceptable epistemology”.
Legg, Catherine
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"Put a mark on the errors": Seventeenth-century medicine and science. [PDF]
Leonard A, Parker SE.
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Robustness to fundamental uncertainty in AGI alignment [PDF]
The AGI alignment problem has a bimodal distribution of outcomes with most outcomes clustering around the poles of total success and existential, catastrophic failure.
G. Gordon Worley, I. I. I.
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The Cradle of Humanity: A Psychological and Phenomenological Perspective [PDF]
We present an account of the evolutionary development of the experiences of empathy that marked the beginning of morality and art. We argue that aesthetic and moral capacities provided an important foundation for later epistemic developments.
Horne, Spencer, Montemayor, Carlos
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Davison on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our be-liefs are veridical.
Otávio Bueno
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