Results 151 to 160 of about 7,390 (191)
From "Information" to Configuration and Meaning: In Living Systems, the Structure Is the Function. [PDF]
Int J Mol SciRenati P, Madl P.
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The spiritual core of the hard problem: consciousness as foundational, not emergent. [PDF]
Front PsycholArora A.
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Beyond accommodation: on the structural turn in computational functionalist theories of consciousness. [PDF]
Neurosci ConsciousEllia F, Tsuchiya N.
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, 1992 "Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of
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Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, 2022
If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia are not functional. A resolution of this is offered based on a formal similarity between qualia and numbers. Just as certain sets “play the role of” the number 3 in Peano’s axioms, so a certain physical implementation of a color plays the role of, say, red
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If qualia are mental, and if the mental is functional, then so are qualia. But, arguably, qualia are not functional. A resolution of this is offered based on a formal similarity between qualia and numbers. Just as certain sets “play the role of” the number 3 in Peano’s axioms, so a certain physical implementation of a color plays the role of, say, red
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Synthese, 1996
In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to ...
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In this paper I present two arguments against the thesis that we experience qualia. I argue that if we experienced qualia then these qualia would have to be essentially vague entities. And I then offer two arguments, one a reworking of Gareth Evans' argument against the possibility of vague objects, the other a reworking of the Sorites argument, to ...
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Consciousness and Cognition, 2012
This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The 'classic' conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down 'diet' conception will.
Keith Frankish
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This paper asks whether we can identify a neutral explanandum for theories of phenomenal consciousness, acceptable to all sides. The 'classic' conception of qualia, on which qualia are intrinsic, ineffable, and subjective, will not serve this purpose, but it is widely assumed that a watered-down 'diet' conception will.
Keith Frankish
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Minds and Machines, 1994
I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events.
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I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events.
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Synthese, 1999
Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
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Dans le cadre du debat scientifique sur la conception physicaliste des qualias, l'A. defend la these intentionnaliste de l'apparence phenomenale des couleurs, en particulier, et des caracteristiques qualitatives de l'experience perceptive, en general. Rejetant la forme intentionnaliste de l'internalisme des qualias, l'A.
openaire +2 more sources