Results 51 to 60 of about 21,445 (190)

Una propuesta subléxica para la polisemia- el caso del verbo de desplazamiento salir

open access: yesCírculo de Lingüística Aplicada a la Comunicación, 2017
Este trabajo examina la motivación subléxica del fenómeno de la polisemia representado por el verbo de desplazamiento salir en el marco teórico del Lexicón Generativo.
Ying Luo罗莹
doaj   +1 more source

Blurring Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience: Folk versus Philosophical Phenomenality [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people\u27s understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such ...
Peressini, Anthony F
core   +1 more source

Cognitive Approaches to Phenomenal Consciousness [PDF]

open access: yes, 2018
The most promising approaches to understanding phenomenal consciousness are what I’ll call cognitive approaches, the most notable exemplars of which are the theories of consciousness articulated by David Rosenthal and Daniel Dennett.
Mandik, Pete
core   +1 more source

A Naturalistic Theory of (In)justice: How Neurophysiology and Metabolic Energy Ground the Perception of Injustice

open access: yesJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Volume 56, Issue 1, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Across different domains, justice is considered either from a perspective concerning mind‐independent features of a situation or from a perspective related to mind‐dependent motives, traits or emotions. Although these approaches have generated valuable insights, they remain largely disconnected from each other.
Shervin MirzaeiGhazi   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

Qualia e Umwelt

open access: yesRevista de Filosofia, 2010
No seu famoso artigo “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974), Thomas Nagel sustenta que existe um ‘ponto de vista’ característico e inescrutável, não acessível objetivamente na experiência, que determina o sentido da própria experiência como evento mental.
Arthur Araújo
doaj   +1 more source

Phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal causality

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 212-232, March 2026.
Abstract There has been extensive debate over whether we can have phenomenal knowledge in the case of epiphenomenalism. This article aims to bring that debate to a close. I first develop a refined causal account of knowledge—one that is modest enough to avoid various putative problems, yet sufficiently robust to undermine the epiphenomenalist position.
Lei Zhong
wiley   +1 more source

Philosophy and Science on the Way to Knowing and Making Consciousness

open access: yesRUDN Journal of Philosophy, 2022
The latest progress in empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes.
Igor F. Mikhailov
doaj   +1 more source

Formulating Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Searle’s and Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance ...
Chua, John Moses
core  

On the primacy and irreducible nature of first-person versus third-person information [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
In\ua0this\ua0essay,\ua0we\ua0will\ua0support\ua0the\ua0claim\ua0that\ua0at\ua0the\ua0current\ua0level\ua0of\ua0scientific advancement\ua0a)\ua0some\ua0first-person\ua0accounts\ua0cannot\ua0be\ua0reduced\ua0to\ua0their third-person\ua0neural\ua0and ...
Facco, Enrico   +2 more
core   +2 more sources

Ontology After Folk Psychology; or, Why Eliminativists Should Be Mental Fictionalists

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 1-11, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction.
Ted Parent
wiley   +1 more source

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