Results 61 to 70 of about 21,445 (190)
, 2013 Um dos maiores desafios a qualquer teoria da consciência é explicar o caráter fenomenal dos estados conscientes. Por que estados conscientes estariam associados a determinadas sensações? Lewis (1929), quem primeiro introduziu o termo, definia “qualia” como estados irredutivelmente subjetivos que seriam inefáveis, infalíveis e privados.
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, 2003 Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory.
Bain, D.T.
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Journal of Sensory Studies, Volume 41, Issue 1, February 2026.ABSTRACT This review synthesizes recent research on the physiological blind spot as a model for studying the interplay between attention, perception, and conscious visual experience. Scanning studies from 1996 to 2025, the review focuses on eye‐tracking methodologies, predictive coding, clinical translation, and individual variability.
Alessandro Bortolotti, Riccardo Palumbo
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Functionalism, revisionism, and qualia [PDF]
, 2016 From the editor's introduction: "Ron Chrisley and Aaron Sloman open Part I of this issue with their article “Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia.” Chrisley and Sloman discuss revisionism about qualia—the view that tries to navigate between naïve ...
Chrisley, Ron, Sloman, Aaron
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Escritura y Pensamiento, 2017 El presente artículo muestra el carácter problemático de los qualia para una teoría de lo mental. Con el término ‘qualia,’ hacemos referencia a aspectos no intencionales de estados mentales eminentemente cualitativos como pueden ser las experiencias perceptuales, las emociones, los humores y las sensaciones corporales.
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Psychophysiology, Volume 63, Issue 1, January 2026.ABSTRACT Experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have attempted to understand the underlying functioning of one's body experience. This has resulted in standardized methods involving multisensory manipulations and physiological, behavioral, and subjective measures.
Marte Roel Lesur +5 more
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Frontiers in Psychology, 2013 The proposed model holds that, at its most fundamental level, visual awareness is quantized. That is to say that visual awareness arises as individual bits of awareness through the action of neural circuits with hundreds to thousands of neurons in at ...
W Alexander Escobar
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WHERE EXPERIENCES ARE: DUALIST, PHYSICALIST, ENACTIVE AND REFLEXIVE ACCOUNTS OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS [PDF]
, 2006 Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind ...
Velmans, Prof Max
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Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Volume 55, Issue 4, December 2025.ABSTRACT Cognitive science needs phenomenology, not despite, but because of the epistemic challenges posed by consciousness. This article argues that the pervasive presence of intuitive dualism, the empirical cognitive tendency to distinguish the mental from physical, is a widespread and entrenched feature of human experience.
Rebecca Peng, Amit Hagar
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Dennett’s Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness [PDF]
, 2010 It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind.
Sytsma, Justin
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