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Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances
Mind, 2005The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse-understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational-is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus 'saving the ethical appearances'. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist.
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2005
Abstract Suppose that Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program (1984, ch. 6, 1988) has succeeded perfectly on its own terms-something I think not unlikely. The quasi-realist has offered a special semantics for sentential expressions of moral attitudes; he has thereby earned the right to echo everything the moral realist says; and he has ...
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Abstract Suppose that Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realist program (1984, ch. 6, 1988) has succeeded perfectly on its own terms-something I think not unlikely. The quasi-realist has offered a special semantics for sentential expressions of moral attitudes; he has thereby earned the right to echo everything the moral realist says; and he has ...
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Pragmatism, Quasi-realism, and the Global Challenge
2007Abstract William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: ‘‘round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”.
David Macarthur, Huw Price
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Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003Simon Blackburn defends a ‘quasi-realist’ view intended to preserve much of what realists want to say about moral discourse. According to error theory, moral discourse is committed to indefensible metaphysical assumptions. Quasi-realism seems to preserve ontological frugality, attributing no mistaken commitments to our moral practices. In order to make
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Practical Expressivism, Expression, and Quasi-Realism
2021Abstract According to practical expressivism, moral judgements express moral attitude types insofar as they advertise a claim of objective authority for them, where this involves a preparedness to defend them and to insist upon their acceptance by others.
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Lewis and Blackburn on quasi-realism and fictionalism
Analysis, 2006van Dalen, D. 1994. Logic and Structure. Berlin: Springer. Hellman, G. 1989. Mathematics Without Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hilbert, D. and P. Bernays. 1934. Grundlagen der Mathematik. Volume 1. Berlin: Springer. Field, H. 1998. Some thoughts on radical indeterminacy. The Monist 81: 253-73. Repr. in H. Field, Truth and the Absence of Fact. 2001.
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Quasi‐Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence
Analytic Philosophy, 2012Like Catherine, we can question our own evaluative assessments of our circumstances. We seem to be able to separate the possibility, in thought, that our judgment represents a clear-cut reality from the possibility that the sentimental color of our world is a thing of our imagination.
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QUASI-REALISM, ACQUAINTANCE, AND THE NORMATIVE CLAIMS OF AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT
The British Journal of Aesthetics, 2004My primary aim in this paper is to outline a quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has recently argued against the plausibility of this project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, namely their supposed ‘autonomy’. I argue against Hopkins’
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Kant, Quasi‐Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement
European Journal of Philosophy, 2001Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response.
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Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem
The Philosophical Quarterly, 1999Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted (e.g., conditional and disjunctive) contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral ...
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