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Quine on Modality

Synthese, 1968
Over the past thirty-two years, Quine has presented a number of arguments against the modalities, his criticism culminating in Word and Object. During the same period, modal logic has flourished as never before, and a number of semantic systems for the different modalities have been proposed, apparently quite unencumbered by Quine’s criticism.
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Quine's ‘limits of decision’

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1999
AbstractIn a 1969 paper, Quine coined the term ‘limits of decision”. This term evidently refers to limits on the logical vocabulary of a logic, beyond which satisfiability is no longer decidable. In the same paper, Quine showed that not only monadic formulas, but homogeneous k -adic formulas for arbitrary k lie on the decidable side of the limits of ...
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Closure and Quine's *101

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1941
The purpose of this paper is to suggest two alternatives to Quine's definition of closure. These new definitions have two advantages over Quine's definition, and they probably are the simplest definitions having both advantages. The two advantages are:(1).
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QUIN

Proceedings of the international symposium on Women and ICT creating global transformation - CWIT '05, 2005
This paper describes QUIN, an organization of women inventors in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Estonia.
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On Quine's axioms of quantification

Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1941
In his Mathematical logic, Quine adopts as axioms of quantification all statements specified by the first five of the six metatheorems listed below. The sixth serves as a rule of inference, and is the only primitive rule of inference used. The metatheorems in question are as follows:The theme of the present paper is that *101 may be eliminated by means
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Quine's philosophy of science

Synthese, 1968
A fairly definite philosophy of science can be extracted from Quine’s Word and Object (henceforth referred to as WO). Earlier versions of his philosophy of science, for example in his From a Logical Point of View, contain phenomenalist and instrumentalist tendencies of thought, but in WO these have almost entirely disappeared in favour of an explicitly
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Quine's Scientific Realism Revisited

Theoria (Stockholm), 2020
Raimund Pils
exaly  

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