Results 101 to 110 of about 74,982 (275)

Speculative Unity in Hegel's Restrictive Identity Claim

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract Hegel identifies thought with the ‘in itself’ of things. It is common to read the statement as an unrestricted claim regarding Hegel's metaphysical view of reality. I argue it should be read as the expression of what speculative truth achieves.
Ana Vieyra
wiley   +1 more source

Le concept de vertu dans une perspective évolutive

open access: yesLimbaj si Context, 2019
The results of the scientific interest in the concept of virtue presents a vast theoretical panorama extended in time and space. In antiquity as well as in the Age of Enlightenment, the notion of virtue is at the center of the concerns of philosophers ...
Ecaterina Foghel , Angela Coşciug
doaj   +1 more source

Difference and the Liberation of Sufficient Reason

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) holds that every event and entity can be explained by a sufficient reason or cause. Philosophers have long struggled with the question of the PSR's compatibility with freedom, for if what occurs or exists follows necessarily from its sufficient reason then it seems it could not have been otherwise ...
Louis Matheou
wiley   +1 more source

Are rational expectations really rational? [PDF]

open access: yesEconomics Letters, 1992
Abstract This article investigates whether ‘rational expectations’ are really rational, i.e. whether they maximize agents' utilities in some way. For that purpose we construct a model where each agent may have a whole array of expectations schemes, including the rational expectations one.
openaire   +1 more source

Hume, Malebranche and 'rationalism'

open access: yes, 2008
Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an 'empiricist' critique of 'rationalism'. This view is often illustrated - or rejected - by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'.
Kail, PJE
core   +1 more source

Why Does Mengzi Consider Human Nature Good?

open access: yesEuropean Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
Abstract This essay examines the theoretical relation between moral sentiments and the goodness of human nature in Mengzi's moral philosophy. Mengzi's claim that human nature is good is often understood through the heart of compassion and the sages' exemplary achievements.
Dobin Choi
wiley   +1 more source

THE KUHNIAN ASPECTS OF THE CHOMSKYAN SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM

open access: yesFacta Universitatis Series: Linguistics and Literature, 2006
This paper analyzes Chomsky's system of grammatical description seeking elements that might prove that his approach, started in 1957 with the publication of Syntactic Structures, actually marked a scientific "leap" in the sense that Thomas Kuhn described
Đorđe Vidanović
doaj  

Why Bayesian Rationality Is Empty, Perfect Rationality Doesn't Exist, Ecological Rationality Is Too Simple, and Critical Rationality Does the Job [PDF]

open access: yes
Economists claim that principles of rationality are normative principles. Nevertheless, they go on to explain why it is in a person's own interest to be rational.
Max Albert
core  

Theological Doctrines as Scientific Theories? Thinking along with and beyond McGrath

open access: yesInternational Journal of Systematic Theology, EarlyView.
Abstract McGrath's recent analysis of the parallels between scientific theory formation and the development of theological doctrine in The Nature of Christian Doctrine (OUP, 2024) is insightful and largely compelling, but also raises some questions and areas for further exploration. First, there is a remarkable back‐and‐forth between uses of ‘doctrine’
Gijsbert van den Brink
wiley   +1 more source

Linguistic Fundamentalism

open access: yesRespectus Philologicus, 2016
The term fundamentalism was first used in 1910 in the United States with reference to the American Protestants who had literal understanding of the Bible and rejected the theory of evolution.
Marek Ruszkowski
doaj   +1 more source

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