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Explaining mobilization for revolts by private interests and kinship relations. A response to the comment by Nieva. [PDF]
Armandola NG, Doehne M, Rost K.
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Biased replay of aversive and uncertain outcomes underlies irrational decision making
Seow TX+3 more
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Economica, 1991
Quantity rationing is often observed to occur in actual markets where quality is difficult to observe. Standard theory suggests such markets must be in disequilibrium, since firms could increase profits by raising price. This paper develops a model in which consumers learn about firm quality from noisy observations of output quality.
Allen, Franklin, Faulhaber, Gerald R
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Quantity rationing is often observed to occur in actual markets where quality is difficult to observe. Standard theory suggests such markets must be in disequilibrium, since firms could increase profits by raising price. This paper develops a model in which consumers learn about firm quality from noisy observations of output quality.
Allen, Franklin, Faulhaber, Gerald R
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Are `Rational Conjectures' Rational?
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987The concepts of 'rational conjectures' and 'reasonable conjectures' are critically reviewed. It is shown that their operation depends crucially on an invisible, non-optimizing 'deus ex machina'. Hence, these concepts are not really suitable for understanding competition among optimizing firms.
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Clinical Ethics, 2008
Triage-like procedures for solving the problems of rationing cannot work. And anyway, why should health- and medical workers carry the can for the economic and political decisions of their managers and our politicians? To foist rationing decisions onto them is a political con-trick, a deliberate attempt to deflect managerial and political ...
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Triage-like procedures for solving the problems of rationing cannot work. And anyway, why should health- and medical workers carry the can for the economic and political decisions of their managers and our politicians? To foist rationing decisions onto them is a political con-trick, a deliberate attempt to deflect managerial and political ...
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Hastings Center Report, 2015
AbstractA commentary on “Why It's Not Time for Health Care Rationing,” by Peter A. Ubel, in the March‐April 2015 issue.
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AbstractA commentary on “Why It's Not Time for Health Care Rationing,” by Peter A. Ubel, in the March‐April 2015 issue.
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European Journal of Political Economy, 1996
Abstract This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with ...
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Abstract This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with ...
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Economic Rationality and Rational Credence
International Journal of Applied Behavioral Economics, 2019The aim of this article is to show that rational maximizer agents, i.e. economic rationality, do not parsimoniously with rational credence, i.e. agents preferences driven by beliefs, traditions, idiosyncrasy, culture and/or customs depending on the social state representing a possible credence.
Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera+1 more
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