Results 1 to 10 of about 3,322 (61)
Testing Transitivity of Preferences on Two-Alternative Forced Choice Data [PDF]
Frontiers in Psychology, 2010 As Duncan Luce and other prominent scholars have pointed out on several occasions, testing algebraic models against empirical data raises difficult conceptual, mathematical, and statistical challenges.
Michel Regenwetter +2 more
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Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings
Games, 2021 We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice ...
Federico Echenique +3 more
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The (Non) Economic Properties of the Law
Games, 2021 This paper shows that the logical properties of constraints imposed by law are fundamentally different from other constraints considered in economics such as budget constraints and bounded rationality constraints, such as the ones based on inattention or
Leo Katz, Alvaro Sandroni
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Rationalizability and Epistemic Priority Orderings [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2017 At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known.
Emiliano Catonini
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Common Belief in Choquet Rationality and Ambiguity Attitudes – Extended Abstract [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2019 We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of (unambiguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by Choquet rationality and common beliefs in Choquet rationality in the ...
Adam Dominiak, Burkhard Schipper
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Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games? [PDF]
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, 2016 We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game.
Sujata Ghosh +2 more
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Epistemically Robust Strategy Subsets
Games, 2016 We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types.
Geir B. Asheim +2 more
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Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning
Games, 2010 In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability
Andres Perea
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Individually-rational collective choice [PDF]
, 2007 There is a collection of exogenously given socially-feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually-feasible set.
Andrés Carvajal +9 more
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An Automated Method for Building Cognitive Models for Turn-Based Games from a Strategy Logic
Games, 2018 Whereas game theorists and logicians use formal methods to investigate ideal strategic behavior, many cognitive scientists use computational cognitive models of the human mind to predict and simulate human behavior.
Jakob Dirk Top +2 more
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