Results 241 to 250 of about 4,273,327 (299)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2009
Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes.
openaire +1 more source
Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like “good” or “valuable”, the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes.
openaire +1 more source
2004
Abstract Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in
openaire +1 more source
Abstract Reason and Value collects 15 new papers by leading contemporary philosophers on themes from the work of Joseph Raz. Raz has made major contributions in a wide range of areas, including jurisprudence, political philosophy, and the theory of practical reason; but all of his work displays a deep engagement with central themes in
openaire +1 more source
DESIRES, VALUES, REASONS, AND THE DUALISM OF PRACTICAL REASON
Ratio, 2009AbstractIn On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation.
openaire +1 more source
2023
Abstract This essay is a contribution to the logic of intentions, and to Sellars’s project of interpreting the moral “ought” in terms of “shall.” Using “shall” as an operator to denote the expression of an intention (e.g., “Shall [I go to the park]”), Sellars outlines a number of logical principles which must govern inferences among such
openaire +1 more source
Abstract This essay is a contribution to the logic of intentions, and to Sellars’s project of interpreting the moral “ought” in terms of “shall.” Using “shall” as an operator to denote the expression of an intention (e.g., “Shall [I go to the park]”), Sellars outlines a number of logical principles which must govern inferences among such
openaire +1 more source
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1974
My aim in this paper is to show how confusion and unclarity about reasons for action (reasons for doing) has led to serious error in ethics and the philosophy of action, and to try to set matters right. In Part I I set out what reasons for doing are, and try to make clear the distinction between reasons as justifying actions and reasons as motivating ...
openaire +1 more source
My aim in this paper is to show how confusion and unclarity about reasons for action (reasons for doing) has led to serious error in ethics and the philosophy of action, and to try to set matters right. In Part I I set out what reasons for doing are, and try to make clear the distinction between reasons as justifying actions and reasons as motivating ...
openaire +1 more source
Expert Systems with Applications, 2017
Abstract It is impossible to model human reasoning without taking into consideration the values and goals behind a decision. Although the problem of inference with values and goals has been discussed by a number of authors, many issues still stand in need of further development.
openaire +1 more source
Abstract It is impossible to model human reasoning without taking into consideration the values and goals behind a decision. Although the problem of inference with values and goals has been discussed by a number of authors, many issues still stand in need of further development.
openaire +1 more source
Theory and Decision, 1970
There is a relatively simple argument which shows that science is not, in any important sense, value free. Further, if science is not value free, it may be that the values involved in science rest upon moral considerations. In this paper the author examines one argument for the claim that science essentially involves value, and then looks at the types ...
openaire +1 more source
There is a relatively simple argument which shows that science is not, in any important sense, value free. Further, if science is not value free, it may be that the values involved in science rest upon moral considerations. In this paper the author examines one argument for the claim that science essentially involves value, and then looks at the types ...
openaire +1 more source
Reasons Fundamentalism and Value
2018Here I address the issue of whether the concept of a reason is a basic normative notion. I do this by considering whether the attempts to analyze this notion in terms of “ought” succeed, as I think these are the most promising accounts. I consider the attempts of Broome, and of Kearns and Star, to attempt to analyze reasons in terms of oughts, and ...
openaire +1 more source
2018
Abstract It is a familiar thought that in friendship and romance, people’s good qualities are reasons for loving them. This chapter clarifies the kinds of reasons—and the forms of reasons-responsiveness and evaluation—at issue. It offers a new model for understanding love as a form of valuing.
Kate Abramson, Adam Leite
openaire +1 more source
Abstract It is a familiar thought that in friendship and romance, people’s good qualities are reasons for loving them. This chapter clarifies the kinds of reasons—and the forms of reasons-responsiveness and evaluation—at issue. It offers a new model for understanding love as a form of valuing.
Kate Abramson, Adam Leite
openaire +1 more source
Utilitas, 2008
It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this ‘teleological’ conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that.
openaire +1 more source
It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this ‘teleological’ conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that.
openaire +1 more source