Results 201 to 210 of about 2,247,343 (229)
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2001
Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Giving reasons and given reasons
2021Abstract Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts.
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2001
Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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Abstract Grice deals with the nature of practical and non‐practical (‘alethic’) reasoning, particularly what may be called imperfect reasoning. It consists of ‘misreasoning’ (the misapplication of good principles of reasoning), ‘incomplete reasoning’ (formally invalid but nonetheless correct inferences due to a missing premise that is ...
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Symposium, 1999
Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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1997
Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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Abstract We have reasons to believe, to act, to feel. We deal in reasons at every turn—for example I have reason to believe you covered for me in an emergency, reason to feel grateful and so reason to thank you in some more or less substantial way.
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2018
Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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Many think it is a truism that, whatever else they are, normative reasons are the kind of things that we reason with. Agents use reasons as guides to determine what to do, as well as to determine what to believe, or not believe. Jonathan Way and others have argued for a stronger claim that reasons just are premises in practical or theoretical reasoning.
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2010
This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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This chapter examines some popular justifications for public reason-giving common in liberal political thought. An obvious way of arguing in favor of the duty to give reasons is to point out that publicly substantiating decisions is an intrinsically valuable practice. Giving reasons simply makes for better decision-making.
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