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To reason or not to reason: Is autobiographical reasoning always beneficial?
New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 2011Autobiographical reasoning has been found to be a critical process in identity development; however, the authors suggest that existing research shows that such reasoning may not always be critical to another important outcome: well-being. The authors describe characteristics of people such as personality and age, contexts such as conversations, and ...
Kate C, McLean, Cade D, Mansfield
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1996
Several varieties of metareasoning are discussed. The prototypical case is argument analysis, namely the interpretation and/or evaluation of arguments. A second special case is self-reflective argumentation. A third case is methodological reflection, namely the formulation, interpretation, evaluation, and application of methodological principles; these
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Several varieties of metareasoning are discussed. The prototypical case is argument analysis, namely the interpretation and/or evaluation of arguments. A second special case is self-reflective argumentation. A third case is methodological reflection, namely the formulation, interpretation, evaluation, and application of methodological principles; these
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2023
Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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Abstract Suppose Bob says, “I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic replies, “But why do you want to have reasons?” Bob responds, “It’s just a brute fact about me. I want to have reasons for what I do.” The skeptic pounces: “But then you’re unreasonable.
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Annual Review of Psychology, 1990
Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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Strict theories of reasoning are schoolmarmish in their insistence on rules and structure, but this gives them an advantage when inference is relatively well behaved. In the case of reasoning with deductively valid arguments, Strict theories give a convincing account of the universality of certain inference forms and the productivity of reasoning in ...
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2005
AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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AbstractThis chapter examines Hume’s theory of empirical reason, and the difference between its rational and its irrational exercise (reasoning reasonably and unreasonably). The theory has five structural levels: (1) reasoning from one matter of fact or real existence to another takes the form of an inference from an impression to an idea; (2 ...
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2001
Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Abstract Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that ...
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Philotheos, 2018
This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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This article is published as Vuckovic, M. (2018). Reason’s Reasons: First Principles in the Second-Century Pagan Apologetic. Philotheos, 18(2), 208-232. https://doi.org/10.5840/philotheos201818216. ; The 2-c debate between the Greek Apologists and the pagan Graeco-Roman tradition is multifaceted and complex.
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Symposium, 1999
Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Katherine Mo"ison charges that in my book, Back to Reality, ffailed to make my case for the adoption of a modest realism in postmodem (na"ative) therapy, because f failed to establish the motive behind that movement's adoption of antirealism. Infact, in Back to Reality, I put forth several reasons for therapists of all stripes to favor a modest realism
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Giving reasons and given reasons
2021Abstract Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts.
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Episteme, 2015
ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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ABSTRACTHilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly ...
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